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INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRECLUSION

Howard M. Erichson*
Res judicata is hard enough already. Consider it at the
interjurisdictional level, and we are asking for headaches. But con
sider it at that level we must, because litigation trends make in
terjurisdictional preclusion1 more important than ever. Lawyers,
judges, litigants, and other litigation participants increasingly must
contemplate the possibility that a lawsuit will have claim-preclusive
or

issue-preclusive

effect

in

a

subsequent

suit

in

another

jurisdiction.
With great frequency, multiple lawsuits arise out of single or re
lated transactions or events. Mass tort litigation and complex com
mercial litigation provide the most emphatic examples, but the
phenomenon of multiple related lawsuits extends to every comer of
litigation, including intellectual property,2 matrimonial,3 criminal,4

* Assistant Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. B.A. 1985, Harvard;
J.D. 1990, NYU.
Ed. I am grateful to Michelle Adams, Ahmed Bulbulia, Stephen
Burbank, Andrea Catania, Edward Hartnett, Michael Risinger, Linda Silberman, Allan
Stein, and Charles Sullivan for their generous and insightful comments; to Esther Cohen,
Joseph Hanlon, and Patrick O'Byrne for their excellent research assistance; and to the Seton
Hall Law School faculty scholarship fund for financial support of this project.
1. By "interjurisdictional preclusion," I am referring to the binding effect of a judgment
on subsequent judicial proceedings in other jurisdictions. My focus is on the binding effect of
a judgment as a matter of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. This article seeks to build on
important work done by others concerning interjurisdictional preclusion. Especially, it tries
to build on the work started by Ronan E. Degnan in Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE LJ.
741 (1976), and continued by Stephen B. Burbank in Jnterjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith
and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 733
(1986).
2. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (involv
ing multiple patent infringement actions brought by a purported patentholder); Stevenson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (same).
3. See, e.g., Brennan v. Orban, 678 A.2d 667 (N.J. 1996) (involving a divorce proceeding
and separately filed marital tort complaint alleging domestic violence).
4. See, e.g., Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987) (involving a private civil RICO
litigation following a criminal RICO conviction); Texaco, Inc. v. Borda, 383 F.2d 607 (3d Cir.
1967) (involving parallel civil and criminal proceedings); Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC036876,
1997 WL 45143 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1997) (involving a wrongful death tort suit following a
murder acquittal).
-
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antitrust,s personal injury,6 securities,7 commercial,8 products liabil
ity,9 environmental,10 and civil rights.11
The participants in those multiple related lawsuits, moreover,
increasingly find themselves litigating in far-flung forums. With
continuing advances in transportation and communication, growing
nationalization and internationalization of commerce, and an in
creasingly mobile society resulting in geographically dispersed fam
ily and business networks, it is hardly surprising that related
lawsuits crop up in multiple jurisdictions. Furthermore, related
lawsuits frequently are filed in both state and federal courts. Thus,
controversies become multijurisdictional across two dimensions "horizontally" among different state courts and "vertically" be
tween state and federal courts.
The problem of related lawsuits in multiple forums is exacer
bated by our legal system's failure to provide adequate aggregation
mechanisms for consolidating widespread litigation.12 A recent
spate of reversals of mass tort class certifications13 drives home the
point that litigants often must endure multiple closely related law
suits, rather than resolving the entire controversy in one action.
Proposed aggregation mechanisms that would allow the consolida5. See, e.g., Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936) (involving parallel civil and
criminal antitrust proceedings); Battle v. Liberty Natl. Life Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 877 (11th Cir.
1989) (involving parallel federal and state antitrust suits).
6. See, e.g., In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993); Childers v.
F.A.F. Motor Cars, Inc., 319 S.E.2d 90 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (involving a motor vehicle
accident).
7. See, e.g., In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 568 F. Supp. 1250
(J.P.M.L. 1983); Mirkin v. Wasserman, 858 P.2d 568 (Cal. 1993).
8. See, e.g., Circle Chevrolet v. Giordano, Halleran & Ciesla, 662 A.2d 509 (N.J. 1995)
(involving an action to reform a car-dealership lease and a separate attorney-malpractice suit
for negligence in preparing the lease).
9. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1993);
Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992);
Swine Flu Immunization Prod. Liab. Litig., 464 F. Supp. 949 (J.P.M.L. 1979).

In re
In re

10. See, e.g., In re The Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555
(D. Alaska Jan. 26, 1994).
11. See, e.g., Martin v. Willl:s, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (involving successive race discrimina
tion suits by groups of firefighters).
12. See Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern Mass Tort Litigation,
Prior-Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure, 63 FoRDHAM L. RBv. 989, 101012 (1995).
13. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Wmdsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); Castano v. American
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th
Cir. 1996); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d
768 (3d Cir. 1995); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Flanagan v. Ahearn, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997) (vacating the asbestos settlement class action
approval in In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996), and remanding it for recon
sideration in light of Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997)).
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tion of dispersed litigation appear destined for failure, at least in the·
near term.14
This article examines the problem of interjurisdictional preclu
sion, and, in particular, the problem of choice of preclusion law.
Choice of-preclusion law cannot be appreciated in the abstract, but
rather must be considered in light of litigation realities. Thus, the
article considers the following series of questions: First, how does
preclusion law affect litigation behavior, and what policy implica
tions result from these effects? Second, to what extent does preclu
sion law actually vary among jurisdictions? Third, what is the legal
foundation for interjurisdictional preclusion, and what law ought to
govern interjurisdictional preclusive effect? Fourth, how are courts
in fact dealing with interjurisdictional preclusion, and what implica
tions does that empirical information carry for choice of preclusion
law?
Part I of the article considers the effect of preclusion law on the

behavior of litigation participants and concludes that preclusion law
can affect many of the most significant strategic decisions in litiga14. The most ambitious recent proposal appeared in the ALI Complex Litigation Project,
an elegant and thorough presentation of a comprehensive system for aggregating multiparty,
multiforum actions. The ALI proposals would allow intersystem consolidation - that is,
consolidation involving transfer from state court to federal court, from federal court to state
court, or from one state to another. See COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDA·
TION AND ANALYSIS (1994). The project's ambitiousness, however, may prove to be its
downfall. Some of those most familiar with the problem have expressed skepticism that the
ALI proposals will become law. See Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex
Litigation Project Rests, 54 LA. L. REv. 977, 977 (1994) ("[T]he Complex Litigation Project
seems destined to represent a massive, engaging intellectual exercise rather than a pragmatic
blueprint that Congress will enact for the conduct of complex litigation."); William W
Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Fed
eral Courts, 78 VA. L. REv. 1689, 1699 (1992) ("Congress . . . is not likely to enact [the
Complex Litigation Project proposals] in the foreseeable future.").
A more modest proposal, the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act (UTLA), would allow
consolidation of related cases pending in multiple state courts. One UTLA proponent has
suggested that the UTLA stands a better chance than the ALI Complex Litigation Project.
See Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALI Project with the
Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REv. 897, 898 (1994). The Act has been
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, but to be
come law it must be adopted by the individual states. It has been enacted in South Dakota
and is under consideration in Kansas, Nebraska, Virginia, and West Virginia. See Mark C.
Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and Practical Advantages of
the State Forum over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 215,
268 & n.287 (1994).
In 1988, a bill introduced by Representative Kastenmeier would have eased federal juris
diction over aggregated multiparty, multiforum litigation. See H.R. 4807, lOOth Cong.
§§ 301-07 (1988). That part of the bill did not become law, nor did it succeed when modified
and reintroduced several years later. See H.R. 2450, 102d Cong. (1991); see also CoMPLEX
LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS ch. 2, cmt.a, reporter's note 3
(1994) (discussing the Kastenmeier bill); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond
Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 9 (1987) (propos
ing multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction).
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tion. Its impact on litigation behavior, however, is not felt primarily
at the forum of the subsequent action (F2), where the parties pres
ent their arguments on claim preclusion or issue preclusion.
Rather, the impact is felt at the forum of the prior action (F1),
where the parties and other participants make decisions based in
part on their expectation of the preclusive effect a judgment will
have. Thus, preclusion law matters to F1's policy choices concern
ing judicial economy, settlement, lawsuit size, litigant zeal, and
other litigation-related values.
To determine whether and how choice of preclusion law matters,
Part II examines the extent to which preclusion law varies from one
jurisdiction to another. Preclusion rules vary much more than most
lawyers would suspect, and they vary in ways that implicate the
strategic incentives discussed in Part I.
Given the importance of preclusion-law variations to strategic
incentives at the initial forum, the choice of preclusion law must not
turn on where the subsequent suit is filed. Rather, as Part III
shows, interjurisdictional preclusion requires a "pure F1 referent"
and should nearly always be governed by F1's own preclusion law.
This applies not only to the state-state and state-federal configura
tions, which are governed by the full faith and credit statute,15 but
also to the federal-state configuration.
Part IV moves from the normative to the empirical. What, in
fact, do courts do when presented with a potentially preclusive
judgment from another United States jurisdiction? Of course, they
acknowledge the judgment's binding effect. But whose law do they
use to determine the nature and extent of the judgment's effect?
The article presents the results of my study of several hundred
interjurisdictional preclusion cases, focusing on the federal-state
configuration. Most often state courts apply their own preclusion
law, rather than the law of the rendering jurisdiction. Generally,
this appears to be done reflexively, as decisions rarely offer any
analysis of choice of preclusion law.
In light of this finding, recommending a complex rule involving
a nuanced balancing of the interests of multiple jurisdictions ap
pears futile. Moreover, given the significance of preclusion law's
effect on litigation behavior, litigation participants need to know at
the outset what preclusion law will ultimately govern, regardless of
where subsequent cases are brought. When it comes to choice of
15. The federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), requires state and
federal courts to give state judicial proceedings "the same full faith and credit" as those
proceedings would be given in the jurisdiction where they occurred.
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preclusion law, what the courts and litigation participants need is a
clear rule determinable at the time of the original action. The
preclusive effect of a judgment, with rare exceptions, should be gov
erned by the preclusion law of the rendering jurisdiction.
!.

PRECLUSION

LAW 'S

EFFECT

ON LITIGATION

BEHAVIOR

Litigation is not a purely rational activity, but that should not
stop us from considering the law's effect on rational actors. It is
true that litigators, litigants, and interested others sometimes act
based on fear, pride, anger, and a host of other emotions. More

over, even if all participants always attempted to make rational de
cisions, they often would fail to do so simply for lack of tactical
insight.16 Nevertheless, enough litigation participants behave ra
tionally and intelligently to make it worthwhile to examine how
such participants would behave17 - in other words, to examine the
strategic significance of preclusion law.

16. Economists refer to this as the concept of bounded rationality. Even if a lawyer, liti
gant, witness, or other participant seeks to act purely in her own self-interest, that participant
can see only so many steps into the future, only so many branches up the decision tree.
Rational decisionmaking is bounded by limits on cognitive ability and incomplete or imper
fect information. See HERBER T A. SIMON, Theories ofBounded Rationality, in 2 MODELS OF
BOUNDED RATIONALITY 408, 410-11 (1982).
17. Litigators frequently make correct strategic decisions by careful preparation and cal
culation. Moreover, litigators' intuition, experience, and collective wisdom can replace pure
deductive rationality as a means of rational decisionmaking. Renowned litigator John W.
Davis spoke of "a sixth sense" on which he relied when making trial decisions. See WILLIAM
H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JoHN W. DAVIS 59 (1973). Louis Nizer
has written of waking in the middle of the night with a hunch that proved decisive at trial.
See Loms NIZER, MY LIFE IN COURT 54-56 (1961).

In chess - one of the better analogies for litigation strategy - intuition and experience
have proved powerful substitutes for pure calculation. Human chess champion Garry
Kasparov has competed ably against the powerful chess computer Deep Blue notwithstand
ing Deep Blue's vastly superior intellectual brute force. In 1996, Kasparov defeated Deep
Blue four games to two, despite Deep Blue's ability to evaluate at least 100 milli on positions
per second. "If Kasparov's victory proves anything, it is the superiority of creative intuition
- the human talent for seeing remote possibilities before calculating all the steps toward
them." Joseph McLellan, Kasparov Tactics Outfox Computer's 'Brute Force'; Intuition Stran
gles Calculation in Chess Match, WASH. PoST, Feb. 18, 1996, at AS. In their 1997 rematch,
with Deep Blue's brain power boosted to 200 million positions per second, the computer beat
Kasparov by a score of 31h.-21h.. See Bruce Weber, Swift and Slashing, Computer Topples
Kasparov, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1997, at Al; Robert D. McFadden, Inscrutable Computer,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1997, at Al. Again, commentators noted the strategic power of human
experience and intuition. As one physicist noted, "What is amazing is that the machine had
to be able to see more than 10 moves ahead and analyze millions of moves a second to match
the intuition (based on long experience) of a fallible person who could analyze maybe one or
two moves a second." Daniel Greenberger, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1997,
at A20. In the chess game of litigation, even when litigators lack the time, inclination, or
brain power to consider a strategy's logical implications 10 moves ahead, litigators can use
intuition, experience, and collective wisdom to reach rational strategic decisions on behalf of
their clients.
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First, where does preclusion law affect litigation behavior? At
F2, the impact of preclusion law on behavior is obvious but limited.
Preclusion law affects behavior at F2 inasmuch as the litigants there
may raise and argue the question of preclusion, and preclusion may
determine the outcome of the case. A party who believes that she
can benefit from claim or issue preclusion will make a motion to
that effect, and her opponent will attempt to fend off adverse pre
clusion. Further, parties at F2 may try to tailor pleadings to maxi
mize or minimize the chance of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.
But more significant than the effect of preclusion law on litiga
tion behavior at F2 is its effect on litigation behavior at F1• In any
lawsuit in which there is a risk of further related litigation, the care
ful litigator must take into account the preclusive effect a judgment
might have in such future litigation and must calculate accordingly.
Others have noted preclusion law's strategic significance,18 but no
one has given it the sustained attention required if we are to under
stand interjurisdictional preclusion in light of the realities of litiga
tion practice.
A.

Zeal and Appeal

Preclusion law affects the vigor with which a party litigates.
Consider the position of any litigant who anticipates future related
litigation with persons who are not parties to the current lawsuit.
The rational litigant will expend resources on the lawsuit in propor
tion to the stakes of the suit. The more that is at stake, the more
tenaciously the parties will fight. Traditionally, mutuality was re
quired for issue preclusion, and it is still required in a number of
jurisdictions.19 With a mutuality requirement, issue preclusion ap
plies only between parties, or those in privity with parties, to the
initial lawsuit. Under such a regime, a rational litigant will consider
only the stakes between the current parties, either in the immediate
lawsuit or in foreseeable further lawsuits between the same parties.
By contrast, when nonmutual issue preclusion is allowed, a rational
litigant will consider the stakes not only between the current par
ties, but also the stakes in foreseeable lawsuits with others. Thus,
wherever a litigant can foresee related litigation with nonparties,
18. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 1, at 767, 797; Stephen B. Burbank, Where's the Beef/
The Interjurisdictional Effects ofNew Jersey's Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L J
87, 100-01 (1996); Graham C. Lilly, The Symmetry of Preclusion, 54 Omo ST. L.J. 289, 311-13
.

.

(1993). Some of the strategic concerns discussed below are also addressed in Howard M.
Erichson, Dealing with Issue Preclusion in Complex Cases, 148 N.J. LJ. 204 (1997).
19.

See infra text accompanying notes 76-95.
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nonmutual issue preclusion produces incentives to invest greater re
sources into winning in order to prevent adverse determinations
that may carry a damaging issue-preclusive effect in subsequent
suits.20 As one litigator puts it, "The lesson is clear - never lose
the prior case."21
The burden of this incentive can be particularly dire for mass
tort defendants, but only if the applicable law allows offensive non
mutual issue preclusion.22 If offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
is allowed, a mass tort defendant - or any defendant facing a large
number of lawsuits growing out of a single incident or related series
of incidents - correctly perceives the first trial as a "must win"
situation. If the defendant loses the first trial and the essential lia
bility issues are decided in favor of the plaintiff, then the defendant
faces the significant risk that each future plaintiff will avail himself
of issue preclusion to establish liability. If, on the other hand, the
defendant wins the first trial by prevailing on the essential liability
issues, then in all likelihood no future plaintiff will be able to use

issue preclusion against the defendant, even if the defendant loses

the second trial. This is because offensive nonmutual issue preclu
sion is generally disallowed when there have been inconsistent
judgments.23 Th.us, a defendant must place enormous emphasis on
prevailing in the first case that goes to trial.24
20. See Charles R.Bruton & Joseph C. Crawford, Collateral Estoppel and Trial Strategy,
Lmo., Summer 1981, at 30, 30-32, 50; Judith Resnik, Tiers, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 971 (1984)

("[T]he possible collateral use of a decision by nonparties inevitably 'ups the stake' of the
first action, thereby providing incentives for parties to invest heavily in the first round.").
This strategic incentive is not limited to the mutuality doctrine but applies to any rule that
expands preclusive effect. "[A]ny tendency to extend the conclusive effects of matters previ
ously adjudicated might easily tend to intensify the effort expended in the initial litigation
and might increase the probability of resort to appeal .. . ." Alan N. Polasky, Collateral
Estoppel - Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 lowA L. REv. 217, 220 (1954).
21. Bruton & Crawford, supra note 20, at 30.
22. "Offensive nonmutual issue preclusion refers to a new claimant's assertion of issue
preclusion to inflict liability against a defendant who previously lost on that issue, in
contrast to defensive issue preclusion, where a party asserts issue preclusion to shield
itself from liability to a claimant who previously lost on that issue."
Erichson, supra note 18, at 204.
23. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-32 (1979); State Farm Frre &
Cas. Co.v.Century Home Components, 550 P.2d 1185, 1191 (Or. 1976); REsTATEMENT (SEC
OND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 29(4) (listing inconsistent determinations as a circumstance that may
justify allowing relitigation of an issue). See generally Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collat
eral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.L. REv. 281 (1957). The rule, how
ever, is not absolute. See, e.g., Batson v.Lederle Lab., 674 A.2d 1013, 1014-15 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App.Div.1996) (applying issue preclusion despite differing prior determinations), cert.
granted 147 NJ. 261 (1996).

24. See Bruton & Crawford, supra note 20, at 32 (observing that offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion makes it critical to the defendant to prevail in the first case, thus making the
question of which case gets tried first of utmost importance).
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Differences in the preclusive effect of alternative holdings pro
vide another example of how preclusion law affects zealousness of
advocacy. Consider a case in which the court gives two or three

alternative factual explanations in support of the judgment, each

one sufficient to support the judgment. If the applicable preclusion

law holds that none of the alternative holdings is "essential to the

judgment" and entitled to issue-preclusive effect,25 then a party
with a strong case on one theory may not allocate much effort to
the other theories.26 If, on the other hand, each alternative holding

is considered "essential to the judgment" and entitled to issue

preclusive effect, then a party concerned about future related law
suits will litigate each theory to the hilt.27

Litigants may also decide whether or not to appeal adverse deci

sions based on the governing law of issue preclusion. If nonmutual

preclusion is allowed, then parties anticipating related litigation

with nonparties will allocate greater resources to winning and thus

will more likely appeal from adverse determinations. Likewise, in

jurisdictions that grant issue-preclusive effect to each alternative

holding, parties may appeal adverse determinations even if they

know that reversal is impossible because of the other alternative
holdings.28

Decisions to appeal can flow even more directly from preclusion

law. In some jurisdictions, a judgment is not considered final for

purposes of claim preclusion and issue preclusion until after ap

peal.29 Under this view of finality, a losing litigant afraid of a judg

ment's potential preclusive effect, and looking to buy some time,

can attempt to forestall the judgment's preclusive effect by filing an
appeal.

B.

Delay

Variations in preclusion law affect litigants' incentives to speed

up or slow down the pace of a lawsuit.30 This is particularly true
25. See infra text accompanying notes 103-05.

26. A plaintiff in such a jurisdiction should consider holding back all but the strongest
theory, if the plaintiff wishes to ensure that a later court will give the winning theory issue
preclusive effect.
27. See Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 106 & n.3 (2d Cir.1970).
28. See Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 453-54 (8th Cir. 1997); Halpern v.
Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 1970).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 126-34.
30. Ethical and procedural rules limit the extent to which litigators may permissibly seek
to delay litigation. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 {1994) (allowing the court to impose costs and
fees on an attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa
tiously"); Fso. R. Crv. P. ll(b)(l) (providing that by presenting a paper to the court, the

Interjurisdictional Preclusion
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when a single litigant is involved in multiple simultaneous lawsuits,
such as a mass tort defendant, a multi-infringed patent plaintiff, or a
party defending against parallel civil and criminal proceedings. The
first-tried case in such situations inevitably carries significant
weight, even without preclusion. In the mass tort context, for ex
ample, the first jury verdict weighs heavily in subsequent settlement
negotiations between the defendant and remaining plaintiffs.
Where mutuality is not required for issue preclusion, however, the
result of the first-tried case takes on enormous strategic significance
far beyond its persuasive value in settlement talks. Because an ad
verse determination may bind the party in all future lawsuits, a con
cerned litigant will seek to use procedural machinations in order to
try a winner first. By delaying less favorable cases and expediting
more favorable cases, a party can try to maximize the chance of a
victory in the first trial.31
Consider also the position of a plaintiff in a civil action against a
defendant who faces criminal charges arising out of the same event
or transaction.32 Depending on the applicable law concerning the
preclusive effect of a criminal judgment in a subsequent civil suit,33
the plaintiff faces an incentive to delay his lawsuit in order to await
attorney certifies that "it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation"); MoDEL RUI.ES
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.1 (1996) (prohibiting frivolous proceedings, assertions,
or controvertions); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1996) ("A lawyer
shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the cli
ent."); MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-lOl(A)(l) (1982) (stating that
zealous advocacy is not violated "by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commit
ments"). Perhaps the most explicit antidelay provision belongs to Texas: "In the course of
litigation, a lawyer shall not take a position that unreasonably increases the costs or other
burdens of the case or that unreasonably delays resolution of the matter." TEX. R. Cr. 3.02.
Nevertheless, there remains ample room for practitioners to retard or expedite the pro
cess. Delay comes not only from ethically questionable stalling tactics and does not require
explicit adjournments. Delay comes, for example, from each nonfrivolous but nonessential
motion. It comes from full relevant discovery when partial discovery might suffice. Delay
comes from demanding a jury rather than bench trial, from forum-shopping for a crowded
docket, and any of a host of other litigation maneuvers. As California's attorney general
once put it, "An incompetent attorney can delay a trial for years or months. A competent
attorney can delay one even longer." THE QuoTABLE LAWYER§ 132.16 (David S. Shrager &
Elizabeth Frost eds., 1986) (quoting Evelle J. Younger).
31. See Bruton

&

Crawford, supra note 20, at 32, 50.

32. The most prominent recent example of a defendant facing both criminal and civil
proceedings arising out of the same event is O.J. Simpson, who faced murder charges for the
death of his ex-wife and another and also faced a wrongful death and survivorship lawsuit
filed by the decedents' families. See Rufo v. Simpson, No. SC036876, 1997 WL 45143 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 1997) (civil); People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 704381 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995) (criminal).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 106-17 (discussing the preclusive effect of guilty
pleas); see also infra text accompanying notes 76-95 (discussing nonmutual issue preclusion).
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a helpful outcome in the criminal proceeding.34 Similarly, in states
with a compulsory party joinder preclusion doctrine,35 a defendant

sued in one of multiple lawsuits by a single plaintiff may seek to
delay its case until a case against another defendant is tried.36
C.

Joinder

Preclusion law's impact on joinder of claims and parties can be

direct and overwhelming. Before deciding what claims to assert in

a lawsuit, a party must know whether it will have another opportu
nity to assert potential claims. This requires knowing the applicable

preclusion rules, and, in particular, the definition of a "claim" for

purposes of claim preclusion.

The broader the definition of "claim," the more that will be pre

cluded in a subsequent action.37 The effect on joinder is clear. If a

narrow definition applies, a plaintiff can decide whether to assert

several "different claims" together or separately, based on any

number of strategic considerations. But if a broad definition ap

plies, then a plaintiff may have no practical choice but to join the
claims in a single lawsuit.

A defendant considering a counterclaim faces a very similar sit

uation. A compulsory counterclaim rule38 that later will preclude

34. See Jonathan C. Thau, Collateral Estoppel and the Reliability of Criminal Determina
tions: Theoretica� Practica� and Strategic Implications for Criminal and Civil Litigation, 70
GEo. LJ. 1079, 1119-20 (1982) (hereinafter Thau, Collateral EstoppelJ; Jonathan C. Thau,
How Lawyers Can Benefit from Trend in Co/lateral Estoppel, NATL. LJ., Nov. 7, 1983, at 22
(hereinafter Thau, Lawyers].

This strategic reasoning applies as well to a plaintiff suing a defendant who faces parallel
civil lawsuits by other plaintiffs. If offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is allowed, each
plaintiff has an incentive to wait and see the result of the other plaintiffs' cases. If another
plaintiff loses, the defense verdict does not bind the waiting plaintiff, but if the other plaintiff
wins, then the waiting plaintiff can attempt to use nonmutual issue preclusion against the
defendant. Courts have addressed this "wait and see" problem by holding that offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion is generally unavailable if the plaintiff easily could have joined in
the prior action. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979); RESTATE·
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(3) (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 29(3) cmt. e (1982) ("A person in such a position that he might ordinarily have been ex
pected to join as plaintiff in the first action, but who did not do so, may be refused the
benefits of 'offensive' issue preclusion where the circumstances suggest that he wished to
avail himself of the benefits of a favorable outcome without incurring the risk of an unfavora
ble one.").

35. See infra text accompanying notes 181-202 (regarding the New Jersey entire contro
versy doctrine and the Kansas one-action rule).
36. See James D. Griffin & Chris Reitz, A Review ofthe Kansas Comparative Fault Act,
KAN. B. AssN. J. June-July 1994, at 26, 27-28 (asserting that under the one-action rule, when
there are multiple lawsuits, "(d]efendants will try to have their case delayed until the other
case is tried").
37.
38.

See infra text accompanying notes 135-41.
See infra text accompanying notes 160-77.
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the counterclaim gives the defendant a trumping reason to assert
the counterclaim, regardless of what tactical considerations might
otherwise have impelled the defendant to save the claim for an

other day, another forum, or another lawsuit. If no compulsory
counterclaim rule or defense preclusion applies, then the counter

claim will not be precluded later, and the defendant might well
choose not to assert the claim in the same lawsuit.39
Decisions concerning joinder of parties, too, can depend on pre
clusion law. In most jurisdictions, failure to join a party has no
claim-preclusive effect. A plaintiff can sue one defendant now and
another defendant in a separate lawsuit later, unless that other de
fendant was in privity with a party, based on a number of strategic
considerations.40 In two jurisdictions, however, the subsequent law39. As a matter of strategy or efficiency, the defendant nevertheless might assert the
counterclaim, perhaps on the theory that the best defense is a good offense. On the _other
hand, if the defendant's affirmative claim is weighty, it may be wasted as a counterclaim. By
asserting the claim as a counterclaim rather than as a separate lawsuit, a defendant forfeits
the choice of forum and timing. A defendant also may be concerned that a judge or jury will
perceive the assertion as "merely a counterclaim" and will view it more as a tactical maneu
ver than as a legitimate claim.
40. A plaintiff may prefer to join all potential defendants in a single lawsuit for many
reasons. Strategically, joinder may encourage divisive finger-pointing among the defendants.
Joinder of defendants often enhances litigational efficiency by allowing the plaintiff to focus
resources on a single lawsuit rather than several. Discovery rules make discovery easier to
obtain from parties than from nonparties, thus a potential defendant provides greater infor
mational value as a joined defendant than as a nonparty. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 33 {al
lowing interrogatories only of parties).
On the other hand, strategy and other factors may lead a plaintiff to exactly the opposite
conclusion. A plaintiff may choose not to join an additional defendant with the expectation
that truthful, helpful testimony may be more forthcoming from a nonparty than from a party.
In a medical malpractice case, for example, a plaintiff's decision to sue only the doctors may
have been motivated by the hope
that, by not joining the hospital and auxiliary staff people, the plaintiff might obtain Jess
hostile testimony from the people at the hospital who were in a position to observe how
the doctors had handled the operation. That would have helped prove a case in a kind
of litigation where a claim is hard to prove, partly because a 'conspiracy of silence' often
enshrouds the doctors.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Examination Before and Behind the "Entire Controversy" Doc
trine, 28 RUTGERS LJ. 7, 21 {1996). As Professor Hazard explains:
[T]he plaintiff's lawyer has to make a calculated judgment: Should I join all the poten
tial defendants and hope at least one of them will point the finger? Or should I omit
some of them and hope that, being thus implicitly exonerated, they will tell what I think
is the truth?

Id.

at 22.
Depending on circumstances, litigational efficiency may persuade a plaintiff either to join
or not to join additional defendants. Although joinder of multiple defendants in one lawsuit
often makes efficient sense, sometimes a plaintiff would rather seek relief in a simple action
against the primary defendant and sue others only in the event that adequate relief cannot be
obtained from that initial defendant. See Symposium, Circle Chevrolet: Pitfalls in Legal
Malpractice, 145 NJ. LJ. 1, 10 (1996) [hereinafter Circle Chevrolet Symposium] {"Forcing
litigants to join additional parties, when some of those claims otherwise would never be as
serted, complicates and delays the underlying litigation by adding layers of unnecessary com
plexity to discovery and other pretrial proceedings." (quoting Howard M. Erichson)).
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suit may be claim precluded if the plaintiff's claims against the vari
ous defendants form part of the same controversy,41 and the

plaintiff faces a powerful incentive to join the additional defendants
in the initial proceeding. The same reasoning applies to a defend
ant contemplating whether to implead a potential third-party de

fendant, such as a joint tortfeasor,

contribution.

D.

who may be liable for

Settlement

Given that the majority of lawsuits are resolved by negotiated

settlement rather than by adjudication, settlement incentives and

disincentives deserve careful attention. They matter to the litigants,
because the outcome of a lawsuit generally turns on settlement.

They also matter to the courts because the courts could not main
tain a manageable docket without a high settlement rate.

As with several other strategic issues, the critical aspect of pre

clusion law here is mutuality of issue preclusion. If nonmutual pre
clusion is allowed, parties are more likely to settle. Any litigant

concerned about future related litigation with other parties should

be willing to pay more - or accept less - in order to reach settle

ment. As a matter of issue preclusion, a favorable judgment cannot

help the party in future litigation with others, because those others
are not bound by the judgment in the absence of privity.

An

unfavorable judgment, however, can harm the party in future litiga

tion with others, because if mutuality is not required, then others

can use the judgment to their advantage even though they were not

parties to the prior lawsuit. Thus, a litigant facing potential related
litigation with others attributes extra value to avoiding a

judgment.42

Fmally, plaintiffs may prefer not to join an additional defendant for valuable reasons un·
related to tactics. Many potential claims go unasserted simply because the plaintiff chooses
not to fight that fight, especially if the potential defendant is someone with whom the plaintiff
has a valued relationship, and especially if the plaintiff can attempt to obtain adequate relief
from other defendants. See id. (observing that a client with a potential legal malpractice
claim may prefer to seek recovery from other defendants, rather than from the client's own
lawyer).
41. The jurisdictions are New Jersey, with its "entire controversy doctrine," and Kansas,
with its "one-action rule." See infra text accompanying notes 181-202.
42. In economic terms, the issue determination in the initial lawsuit can be viewed as a
public good for other litigants. A litigant in the initial lawsuit may be willing to pay money to
prevent the public good from being created. The major problem with public goods is that
each potential beneficiary of the good would prefer to be a free rider, waiting for someone
else to produce the good and then accepting the benefit without having accepted the concom
itant cost or risk. See MANcuR Or.soN, THE Lome OF CoLLECI1VE ACTION! PUBLIC Gooos
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14-16 (1965). This problem arises under preclusion law only if
nonmutual issue preclusion is permitted, and especially if offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
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This settlement incentive may affect the parties unequally,
changing the settlement dynamic and creating a more favorable set
tlement for one of the parties, ordinarily the plaintiff. Consider, for
example, an alleged monopolist facing antitrust challenges from a
number of would-be competitors. If the law permits offensive non
mutual issue preclusion, each early plaintiff gains a bargaining ad
vantage over the defendant, because a judgment can hurt the
defendant more than it can help the plaintiff. A determination that
the defendant engaged in price fixing or unreasonable restraint of
trade may bind the defendant in subsequent antitrust suits, so the
defendant may be willing to sweeten the settlement pot in order to
avoid the risk of an adverse judgment. Similarly, a manufacturer
facing product liability claims by a number of plaintiffs may prefer
to pay additional money to avoid the risk of an issue-preclusive de
termination of a product defect.43 If the first case to reach trial is

weak for the defendant - for example, if the plaintiff is especially

sympathetic or plaintiff's counsel especially well prepared - the
defendant will be even more inclined to settle, so that a stronger
defense case will be the first to reach judgment.44
Perhaps some lawyers take these strategic incentives too far. In
the first Prozac liability case to go to trial, the defendant, manu
facturer Eli Lilly, reportedly paid twenty-eight plaintiffs for a secret
deal. According to news reports, the plaintiffs in return agreed not
sion is permitted. See Steven M. Crafton, Comment, Taking the Oakland Raiders: A Theo
retical Reconsideration ofthe Concepts ofPublic Use and Just Compensation, 32 EMORY L.J.
857, 865 n.50 (1983).
The law of preclusion deals with this free riding by generally prohibiting the use of offen
sive nonmutual issue preclusion when the plaintiff could have joined easily in the initial law
suit. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979); REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(3) (1982); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt.
e (1982). If a private plaintiff prosecutes the first case, other potential plaintiffs generally can
benefit from the judgment only if they absorb part of the cost (especially attorneys' fees) and
risk (especially the risk of being bound by an unfavorable judgment). If the government
prosecutes the first case, however, private plaintiffs may benefit from the judgment via offen
sive nonmutual issue preclusion. For example, in Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331-32, a
private plaintiff was permitted to use offensive nonmutual issue preclusion to benefit from a
favorable judgment in an enforcement action brought against the defendant by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, because the plaintiff could not have joined in the SEC action. In
economic terms, the two scenarios provide a sensible response to the public good-free rider
problem. In order for a private plaintiff to benefit from the public good of a favorable judg
ment on a particular issue, either the plaintiff must have absorbed its share of the cost and
risk by joining the action, or the public good must have been created by the government
funded with tax dollars.

43. Cf Middleborough Horizontal Prop. Regime Council of Co-owners v. Montedison
S.p.A., 465 S.E.2d 765, 769 (S.C. App. 1995) (precluding a polyvinylchloride manufacturer
from relitigating a finding of product defect from an earlier plaintiff's products liability
action).
44.

See Bruton

& Crawford,

supra

note 20, at

50.
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to introduce certain damaging evidence at trial and not to appeal.
The case resulted, as Eli Lilly had hoped, in a defense verdict.45
Such a deal, in my opinion, plainly violates ethical norms. What the
defendant hoped to purchase with its settlement dollars was both
the favorable press coverage of a defense verdict in order to dis
courage future potential plaintiffs, and an elimination of the risk of
offensive nonmutual issue preclusion. A defense judgment not only
avoids the damaging issue-preclusive effect of a liability determina
tion; it also protects against issue preclusion in the future, because
even if the next plaintiff wins, that plaintiff's judgment probably will
not be given nonmutual effect in the face of a prior inconsistent
determination.
These incentives can apply to plaintiffs as well. A risk-averse
patent holder

pursuing infringement

actions against multiple

alleged infringers may prefer to settle each case rather than risk an
adverse judgment. A single determination that the holder's patent
is invalid may bind the plaintiff as a matter of defensive nonmutual
issue preclusion, thus guaranteeing the plaintiff's failure in subse
quent actions.46
In criminal proceedings, preclusion law can affect plea negotia
tions. If a guilty plea has issue-preclusive effect in parallel or subse
quent civil litigation,47 then a defendant is less likely to plead guilty.
Conversely, if a guilty plea has no issue-preclusive effect but a con
viction at trial does have issue-preclusive effect,48 then a defendant
is more likely to plead guilty in order to avoid the damaging preclu
sive impact of a trial conviction. This is particularly true in situa45. See Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S.W.2d 449, 451-52 (Ky. 1996); Maureen Castellano,
The Secret Deal That Won the Prozac Case, 140 NJ. L.J. 377 (1995).
46. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). In some
cases, such as some complex commercial litigation, both the plaintiff and the defendant may
face potential related litigation with others. Examples would include major construction dis
putes and litigation concerning corporate mergers and acquisitions. In such situations, the
availability of nonmutual issue preclusion encourages both the plaintiff and the defendant to
seek settlement. The defendant should be willing to pay more to avoid an adverse judgment,
and the plaintiff should be willing to accept less. Thus, the parties' true settlement positions
- that is, the range within which the parties genuinely would prefer to settle rather than to
proceed to trial - are more likely to overlap, and settlement is more likely to result. Over
lapping settlement positions make settlement possible, but of course that is no guarantee that
settlement will result.
47. Guilty pleas carry issue-preclusive effect under federal law and the law of a minority
of states. See infra text accompanying notes 107-12.
48. Guilty pleas carry no issue-preclusive effect - although they nevertheless may be
admissible in evidence - under a majority of states' laws and according to the REsrATE·
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 cmt. b (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 11317.
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tions in which the criminal penalties pale in comparison to the
potential civil liability.49
E.

Other Litigation Decisions

Issue preclusion creates incentives for parties to support consoli
dation,50 compulsory joinder,51 or class certi:fication.52 Nonparties
cannot be bound by a judgment. When nonmutual issue preclusion
is permitted, however, nonparties can benefit from a judgment.
The 'best way to recreate mutuality of estoppel is to turn nonparties
into parties, by moving to consolidate with other lawsuits, by seek
ing an order to join necessary parties, or by moving for or support
ing class certification. Thus, a defendant facing numerous separate
lawsuits, contrary to traditional common wisdom,53 may favor class
action treatment.
Preclusion law also may affect the choice between a bench trial
and a jury trial, and between a general verdict and a special verdict.
In general, the easier it is to determine precisely what was decided,
the more likely it is that the decision will carry issue-preclusive ef
fect. Thus, a party hoping to reduce the risk of issue preclusion in
subsequent litigation, all else being equal, will prefer a jury trial to a
bench trial and will prefer a general jury verdict to either a special
verdict or general verdict with interrogatories.54
49. See Thau, Collateral Estoppe� supra note 34, at 1095-98 (discussing criminal-civil issue
preclusion against "deep-pocket defendants").
Another effect of issue preclusion law is tbat a criminal defendant's decision whether to
plead guilty or to plead nolo contendere may depend upon which plea will have issue-preclu
sive effect in subsequent civil litigation. See Thau, Lawyers, supra note 34. In some jurisdic
tions, a guilty plea carries issue-preclusive effect, but a nolo plea does not. In general, a plea
of nolo contendere establishes guilt solely for the purpose of the present criminal proceeding
and carries no issue-preclusive effect See FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(e)(6) (stating that evidence of
nolo contendere plea is not admissible against a defendant in any civil or criminal proceed
ing); C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Plea of No/o Contendre or Non Vult Contendre, 89
A.L.R.2D 540, 600 (1963). But see Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-807 (West 1989) ("A defend
ant convicted in a criminal proceeding is precluded from subsequently denying in any civil
proceeding tbe essential allegations of tbe criminal offense of which he was adjudged guilty,
including judgments of guilt resulting from no contest pleas."). A defendant facing botb
criminal and civil liability thus prefers to plead nolo contendere in tbe criminal case, but the
government may find itself pressured by interested citizens - including potential civil plain
tiffs - not to accept a nolo plea.
50.

See generally FED.

51.

See generally FED. R. Crv. P. 19.
See generally FED. R. Crv. P. 23.

52.

R. Crv. P. 42.

See Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARv. L. REv. 664, 679-80 (1979) (noting the history of the
53.

defense bar's staunch opposition to class certification).
54.

See Bruton & Crawford, supra

note 20, at 50.
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Non-Party Participants

Not only does preclusion law affect the behavior of litigants and
litigators, it also affects the behavior of interested nonparties. For
example, a nonparty with an interest in a lawsuit may have a right
to intervene.ss If the nonparty does not intervene, then the judg
ment cannot legally bind the nonparty.s6 A nonparty hoping to use
a judgment for its issue-preclusive effect in subsequent litigation
may choose not to intervene, in order to have the benefit of using
nonmutual issue preclusion without the detriment of being legally
bound by the judgment.s7 The nonparty's strategic position is very
different, however, if a nonparty is likely to be deemed in privity
with a party and therefore bound by the judgment. In that situa
tion, the nonparty is more likely to intervene, because it may prefer
to have more direct control over the litigation. Thus, intervention
decisions can be guided both by the law concerning nonmutual
issue-preclusion and by the law concerning privity.
Closely related to notions of privity is the rule that a judgment

can bind a nonparty if the nonparty controls the litigation.ss Inter
ested nonparties, who otherwise might be tempted to exert influ
ence over the parties' litigation decisions, must temper their
involvement if they wish to avoid being bound by the judgment.
Interested nonparties thus are advised to maintain some distance
between themselves and the parties' strategic decisionmaking, and
to be wary of :financing the litigation of others.s9
Witnesses, too, face incentives based on preclusion law. Non
mutual issue preclusion means that nonparty witnesses have reason
to cooperate - and perhaps to testify in a particular manner when they stand to benefit from the nonmutual issue-preclusive ef
fect of a judgment. For example, if a defendant faces criminal
charges and also potential civil liability, a potential civil plaintiff has
a self-interest in testifying against the defendant in the criminal
trial. If the defendant is convicted, that conviction may benefit the
plaintiff through issue preclusion in the civil litigation.60 The same
incentive that may make a witness more inclined to testify against a
55.
56.

See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
See Martin v. Wtlks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).

57. This strategy may be constrained, however, by the general rule disallowing offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion for plaintiffs who intentionally bypassed the prior action. See
supra note 34.

See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
See Bruton & Crawford, supra note 20, at 50.
60. See United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 158-61 (2d Cir. 1974); Thau, Collateral Es
toppe� supra note 34, at 1118 & n.214.
58.

59.

961
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defendant also may make that person more inclined to press
charges, to alert the government to the problem, or to pressure the
government to prosecute.61
G.

Litigation Behavior and Fz's Policies

We have examined the significance of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion to litigation behavior. What does this have to do with
interjurisdictional preclusion and choice of preclusion law? Preclu
sion law's impact on litigation behavior should drive the analysis of
choice of preclusion law, because the most significant interests at
stake in choice of preclusion law are the litigation-related interests
of the initial forum. In cases in which the initial lawsuit occurs in
one jurisdiction (F1) and the subsequent suit occurs in another juris
diction (F2), the more significant impact of preclusion law on litiga
tion behavior is at F1•
As we have seen, preclusion-sensitive decisions at F1 can include
joinder of claims, joinder of parties, resource allocation, appeals,
efforts to delay or expedite, settlement, guilty pleas, consolidation,
class certification, jury demands, intervention, nonparty involve
ment in litigation control, and witness testimony.

The strategic

choices made by participants at F1 matter not only to the litigants
and their lawyers, but to F1 itself. Preclusion law is based on policy
determinations and value choices, with the understanding and in
tent that preclusion law will affect litigation behavior.62 Each juris
diction's preclusion rules flow from the procedural opportunities
available in that jurisdiction as the F1 forum63 and reflect the extent
to which that jurisdiction chooses to encourage litigants to avail
themselves of those procedural opportunities.
For example, the definition of

claim for purposes

of claim pre

clusion determines the extent to which joinder is encouraged. By
defining

claim broadly,

a jurisdiction encourages joinder of related

61. For example, criminal and civil antitrust enforcement actions pursued by the Depart
ment of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission sometimes are prompted by private entities
- potential antitrust plaintiffs - who are harmed by the defendant's alleged antitrust viola
tions. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Defying the Juggernaut: Netscape Maneuvers for Position in a
Microsoft-Ruled World, N.Y. T IMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at Dl (noting that Netscape president
James Barksdale "has prodded Washington to take antitrust action against Microsoft").
62. Cf. Resnik, supra note 20, at 981-82 (discussing "genuine value choices" made by the
U.S. Supreme Court in its preclusion decisions and suggesting that values rejected by the
Court include differentiation, diffusion of power, deliberate norm enforcement, additional
persuasion opportunities, and revisionism).
63. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS introduction at 10 (1982) (discussing
"the relationship between rules of original procedure and rules of res judicata" and noting
that "when the rules of original procedure constrain the first opportunity to litigate, the rules
of res judicata are adjusted reciprocally").
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claims, with the goal of enhancing litigation efficiency.64 The broad
transactional definition of claim applied by federal courts and many
state courts flows from the generosity of pleading and joinder avail
able under the Federal Rules and similar state rules.65 A narrower
definition of

claim

may reflect a choice to emphasize party auton

omy over judicial economy. Similar considerations apply to the de
cision whether to make certain counterclaims compulsory:

a

compulsory counterclaim rule implies a greater emphasis on effi
ciency than on litigant autonomy.
Similarly, by extending claim preclusion to claims against non
parties, a jurisdiction can encourage joinder of parties. The federal
courts and most state courts permit the joinder of related parties
but neither encourage nor discourage such joinder through preclu
sion law.66 Other jurisdictions, however, strongly encourage party
joinder by precluding related claims against nonparties that could
have been raised in a prior suit. These states assert that their en
forcement of mandatory party joinder through claim preclusion is
designed to enhance efficiency, fairness, and consistency.67 The ex
perience of these jurisdictions bears out the assertion that preclu
sion rules profoundly affect litigation decisions, 68 and the
sometimes heated controversy among lawyers69 confirms the signif
icance of preclusion rules to litigation-related policy.
64. See Hagee v. City of Evanston, 729 F.2d 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1984) (asserting that claim
preclusion is intended to impel "parties to consolidate all closely related matters into one
suit"); Bronstein v. Kalcheim, 467 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (asserting that "the
doctrine of res judicata serves to promote judicial economy by requiring parties to litigate, in
one case, all rights arising out of the same set of operative facts").

65. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS introduction at 9 (1982).
66. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 19, 20.
67. See, e.g., DiTrolio v. Antiles, 662 A.2d 494, 502 (NJ. 1995) ("The purposes of the
[entire controversy] doctrine are threefold: (1) the need for complete and final disposition
through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2) fairness to parties to the action and those
with a material interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of waste and the
reduction of delay."); Eurich v. Alkire, 579 P.2d 1207, 1208 (Kan. 1978) (noting that the one
action rule of the Kansas comparative negligence act "provides machinery for drawing all
possible parties into a lawsuit to fully and finally litigate all issues and liability arising out of a
single collision or occurrence").
68. See Griffin & Reitz, supra note 36, at 27-28 (discussing tactical considerations based
on the one-action rule and noting that when there are multiple lawsuits "[d]efendants will try
to have their case delayed until the other case is tried"); id. at 32 ("The best single piece of
advice to parties in a negligence action is to bring in all potentially responsible parties into
one lawsuit."); Editorial: Time to Reconsider Circle Chevrolet, N.J. LAW., Nov. 4, 1996, at 6
("New suits filed since Circle Chevrolet [(applying the entire controversy doctrine to legal
malpractice)] bring in prior counsel so long as there is the smallest possibility of a finding of
legal malpractice. Simple cases involving two attorneys now become complex multi-party
litigation.").
69. See, e.g., Circle Chevrolet Symposium, supra note 40 (debating the wisdom, fairness,
and efficiency of the entire controversy doctrine as applied to legal malpractice cases); Edito
rial: Entire Controversy, 147 NJ. LJ. 406 (Jan. 27, 1997) ("The current dimension of the
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The decision as to whether to allow nonmutual issue preclusion
- and the further decision whether to allow offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion - raises serious questions concerning litigation
policy at F1• Some attribute the decline of the mutuality rule to
expanded opportunities to join multiple parties in a single lawsuit.70
By allowing nonmutual preclusion, a jurisdiction encourages parties
to take advantage of those opportunities to bring additional parties
into the lawsuit.71

Reasonable policymakers may differ as to

whether such party joinder helps judicial economy, by avoiding
multiple related lawsuits or multiple litigation of a single issue, or
hurts judicial economy, by making each lawsuit more complex.
As a last illustration of the F1 policy choices inherent in preclu
sion rules, a jurisdiction's choice concerning :finality pending appeal
reflects that jurisdiction's balancing of the value of reliability (not
basing preclusion on judgments that may yet be reversed) against
the value of efficiency (not encouraging excessive appeals). In sum,
although preclusion questions are fought out at the time of a subse
quent lawsuit, the law of claim preclusion and issue preclusion re
flects procedural policies that matter to the jurisdiction in which the
initial action takes place.

II.

PRECLUSION LAW DIVERGENCES

Having explored the policy significance of preclusion law's ef
fect on litigation behavior, we turn to differences in preclusion law
among U.S. jurisdictions. Despite preclusion law's policy signifi
cance,

choice of preclusion law matters only if preclusion law varies

from one jurisdiction to another. Which it does. In fact, preclusion
law varies much more than most lawyers would suspect. Moreover,
it varies in ways that trigger the strategic considerations discussed in
Part I.

.

entire controversy doctrine is an unmitigated abomination. . . If the bar has a common
prayer, it is that the bane and affliction of the [current) version of the entire controversy be
lifted . . . . "

).

70.
71.

See REsTATEMENT (SECOND)
See Parklane Hosiery Co.

8 (1982).
439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979)

OF JUDGMENTS introduction at

v. Shore,
("[D)efensive collat
eral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first
action if possible. . . . [If offensive nonmutual issue preclusion is allowed), the plaintiff has
every incentive to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude, in the hope that the first action by another
plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment. . . . Thus offensive use of collateral estoppel will
likely increase rather than decrease the total amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs
will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first action." (cita
tions omitted)); see also Hunter v. City of Des Moines,
(Iowa
(quoting Parklane Hosiery).

300 N.W.2d 121, 124

1981)
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Preclusion Law Commonalities

Many lawyers and judges assume that res judicata is what it is
and that there is little difference from one jurisdiction to another.12
As to much of preclusion law, they are correct. The essential ele
ments of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion look similar
across jurisdictions. Claim preclusion in all fifty states as well as in
the federal courts can be summed up reasonably well as follows: a
valid, final judgment on the merits precludes relitigation of the
same claim between the same parties or their privies.73 Similarly,
the following description of issue preclusion works reasonably well,
as far as it goes, for all United States jurisdictions: "[w]hen an issue
of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment,
the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the
parties."74 In interjurisdictional preclusion cases, courts occasion
ally point out that the result would be the same under the preclu
sion law of F1 or F2•75
72. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 cmt. a (1982) ("[Prior to adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,] there was little difference in the doctrine of res
judicata as expounded in state and federal courts. Indeed, that is still true, so that it is still
usually a moot question whether the effect of a federal judgment is determined by federal law
or state law.").
73. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18, 19 (1982).
74. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
75. See, e.g., Wright v. Chicago Mun. Employees Credit Union, 639 N.E.2d 203, 205 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994) (federal-Illinois); Billiot v. LeBoeuf Bros. Towing Co., 640 So. 2d 826, 828
(La. Ct. App. 1994) (federal-Louisiana); Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 N.W.2d
829, 835 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (Kentucky-Michigan); Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 906
S.W.2d 92, 101 n.7 (Tex. App. 1995) (federal-Texas); Kuhlman v. Thomas, 897 P.2d 365, 368
n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (federal-Washington).
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, published by the American Law Institute in
1982, can be credited with enhancing uniformity of preclusion law. In "restating" the law of
preclusion, the Second Restatement set forth a coherent vision of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion, widely followed by courts around the country. "It is difficult to overstate its influ
ence." GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 106(B)(l) (1994). "Even in draft form, the work's treatment of the law of res judicata
shaped many judicial decisions. . . . Some of its provisions are more controversial than others,
yet there is no question that it is the most authoritative and influential writing on res judicata
in the legal literature." Id.
It is tempting to say that certain "leading cases" also have contributed to the uniformity
of preclusion law, because those cases have been widely followed. The great cases of
Bernhard v. Bank of America, 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942) (Traynor, J.) (allowing nonmutual
issue preclusion), Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University ofIllinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971) (same), and Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (allowing offensive
nonmutual issue preclusion), come especially to mind. Although many courts have indeed
followed these cases, it would be incorrect to credit these cases with creating uniformity. In
fact, they have done exactly the opposite. What made these cases significant was their rejec
tion of traditionally accepted preclusion doctrine; their success is reflected in their holdings
having become the majority view. Far from creating uniformity, these cases took what was
uniform - the strict mutuality requirement - and replaced it with either permanent or
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It is not in the basic definition of claim preclusion and issue pre
clusion where jurisdictions differ. It is rather in the details. How is
"same claim" defined? Who can assert issue preclusion? What
constitutes a final judgment? What are the bounds of privity?
When is a judgment "on the merits"? When is a determination es
sential to the judgment? In the law of preclusion, the details are
many, and they matter.
B.

Preclusion Law Divergences
1. Mutuality

The most important split in preclusion law concerns mutuality.
Mutuality traditionally was required for the assertion of issue pre
clusion.76 In other words, a litigant could not assert issue preclusion
from a judgment unless she was bound by the same judgment that is, unless she was a party or in privity with a party to the initial
action. Under the traditional rule, issue preclusion applied only
when the parties to the subsequent lawsuit were the same as the
parties ·to the prior lawsuit.
In

1942, Justice Roger Traynor of the California Supreme Court
Bernhard v. Bank of America77 that rejected

wrote the opinion in

the mutuality requirement under California preclusion law. Nearly
thirty years later, the United States Supreme Court followed suit,
rejecting mutuality as a matter of federal law in

Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation.78 Following
Bernhard and Blonder-Tongue, most of the states rejected the strict
mutuality requirement for issue preclusion.79 Most, but not all.

transitional disaccord. That, of course, is the price of common law development in a multiju
risdictional system.
76. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912); REsrATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942) ("[A] person who is not a party . . .
is not bound by or entitled to claim the benefits of an adjudication . . . . ).
"

77. 122 P.2d 892 (Cal. 1942).
78. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
79. See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Mutuality ofEstoppel as Prerequisite ofAvailability of
Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3o 1044 (1970 & 1996
Supp.) (citing cases); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 reporter's note (1982)
(same).
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A number of states cling to the traditional mutuality require
ment.

Alabama,80 Florida,81 Georgia,82 Kansas,83 Mississippi,84

North Dakota,8s and Virginia86 require mutuality. Louisiana, which
only recently adopted the doctrine of issue preclusion, appears to

80. See Jones v. Blanton, 644 So. 2d 882, 886 {Ala. 1994) ("Although many courts, includ
ing the Federal courts, have dispensed with the mutuality requirement, it remains the law in
Alabama.").
81. See Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919-20 (Fla. 1995) ("[W)e are unwilling to
follow the lead of certain other states and of the federal courts in abandoning the require
ments of mutuality in the application of collateral estoppel."); Jones v. Upjohn Co., 661 So.
2d 356, 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1995) (denying defensive nonmutual issue preclusion in a
criminal-civil configuration); Newport Div., Tenneco Chems., Inc. v. Thompson, 330 So. 2d
826, 828 {Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (declining to abandon the mutuality requirement). But see
Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209 {Fla. 1989) {allowing defensive nonmutual issue preclusion
in a criminal-civil configuration).
82. See GA. CoDE ANN. § 9-12-40 {1993); Farred v. Hicks, 915 F.2d 1530, 1533-34 {11th
Cir. 1990) (applying Georgia law to require mutuality); Gilmer v. Porterfield, 212 S.E.2d 842,
843 (Ga. 1975); see also Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 399 S.E.2d 708, 709 {Ga. Ct.
App. 1990) ("[I]dentity of parties or their privies is required in order to act as bar to second
lawsuit [under collateral estoppel doctrine]."), affd., 409 S.E.2d 847 {Ga. 1991).
83. See McDermott v. Kansas Pub. Serv. Co., 712 P.2d 1199, 1208-09 (Kan. 1986) (re
jecting the offensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion); Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Ins.
Agency, 498 P.2d 265, 273 (Kan. 1972) (rejecting the defensive use of nonmutual issue preclu
sion and stating that "a litigant may invoke the bar of the prior judgment only if he would
have been bound by it had it gone the other way"); see also Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex FP,
Inc., 584 A.2d 1214 {Del. Super. Ct 1991) (applying Kansas preclusion law to require mutual
ity). But see Crutsinger v. Hess, 408 F. Supp. 548, 554 (D. Kan. 1976) (applying Kansas law to
allow defensive nonmutual issue preclusion and stating that Kansas had rejected only offen
sive use of nonmutual issue preclusion).
84. See Hurst v. Metro Ford Sales & Service, Inc., No. 3:95CV55-B-A, 1996 WL 671384,
at *2-3 (N.D. Miss. Sept 23, 1996) (applying Mississippi law to require strict mutuality);
Walker v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 793 F. Supp. 688, 695-96 (N.D. Miss. 1992) (same);
McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335, 338 (S.D. Miss. 1980) (same);
Magee v. Griffin, 345 So. 2d 1027, 1030 (Miss. 1977) (same).
85. See Hofsommer v. Hofsommer Excavating, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 380, 384 (N.D. 1992);
Armstrong v. Miller, 200 N.W.2d 282, 287-88 (N.D. 1972).
86. See Angstadt v. Atlantic Mut Ins. Co., 457 S.E.2d 86, 87 (Va. 1995) {"For collateral
estoppel to apply . . . the parties to the prior and subsequent proceedings, or their privies,
must be the same . . . . [!']here . . . must be 'mutuality'
"); Dual & Assocs., Inc. v. Wells,
403 S.E.2d 354, 356 (Va. 1991) (rejecting the defensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion);
Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 355 S.E.2d 579, 581 (Va. 1987) {"As recently as 1980, this
Court made a considered, unanimous decision to resist the so-called 'modem trend' and not
to abrogate the mutuality requirement . . . We perceive no error [in this decision]."); Norfolk
& W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 272 S.E.2d 217, 219 (Va. 1980) ("In Virginia, the estab
lished rule is that collateral estoppel requires mutuality . . . especially when the estoppel is
used 'offensively.'").
. . • •
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require mutuality as well.87 Ohio provides a limited public policy
exception but generally adheres to the mutuality requirement.88
The states that require mutuality are fully aware that they are in
the minority; their decision to retain the requirement is deliberate.
The Virginia Supreme Court, for example, asserted that "this Court
made a considered, unanimous decision to resist the so-called 'mod
em trend' and not to abrogate the mutuality requirement."89 Simi
larly, the Florida Supreme Court stated in 1995, "[W]e are unwilling
to follow the lead of certain other states and of the federal courts

in

abandoning the requirements of mutuality in the application of col
lateral estoppel."90
Among the jurisdictions that have abandoned the traditional
mutuality requirement, most not only allow defensive nonmutual
issue preclusion, but under certain circumstances allow offensive as
well,91 following the lead of the United States Supreme Court

in

'01. Louisiana adopted issue preclusion in 1991 by statute. See LA. R:Ev. STAT. ANN
§ 13:4231 (West 1991). Prior to that, Louisiana rejected any use of issue preclusion, whether
mutual or nonmutual. See LA. R:Ev. STAT. ANN § 13:4231 cmt. b (stating that this statute
changed the law by formally adopting issue preclusion); Oliver v. Department of Pub. Safety
& Corrections, 669 So. 2d 570, 572 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "issue preclusion [was] a
principle heretofore rejected by our civilian system"). The language of the new issue preclu
sion statute appears to require mutuality, but it remains to be seen how Louisiana courts will
treat the statute. Few cases filed since the statute's effective date of January 1, 1991, have
made their way into published Louisiana decisions, and none of them have presented the
issue of nonmutual issue preclusion. For further discussion of preclusion in Louisiana, see
infra text accompanying notes 119-24.
88. See Cashelmara Villas Ltd. Partnership v. DiBenedetto, 623 N.E.2d 213, 215 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993) {"Inherent in the concept of collateral estoppel is the requirement of mutual
ity of parties. However, the requirement is waivable 'upon the basis of serving justice within
the framework of sound public policy."' (citation omitted)); Goodson v. McDonough Power
Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 982-84 {Ohio 1983) (emphasizing the limited nature of the pub
lic policy exception to the mutuality requirement); cf. McAdoo v. Dallas Corp., 932 F.2d 522,
524-25 {6th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging Ohio's rejection of offensive nonmutual issue preclu
sion but concluding that Ohio courts would allow defensive nonmutual issue preclusion
under certain circumstances).
89. Selected Risks, 355 S.E.2d at 581.
90. Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919-20 {Fla. 1995).
91. See supra note 22 {defining offensive and defensive nonmutual issue preclusion).
.

.
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Michigan93 and Tennessee,94 however,

have chosen to allow defensive but not offensive nonmutual issue
preclusion. Illinois allows offensive nonmutual issue preclusion, but

apparently under more limited circumstances than allowed under
federal preclusion law.9s
Cases involving nonmutual preclusion illustrate the importance
of choice of preclusion law. The mutuality split mattered, for exam
ple, in Columbia Casualty Co.
from toxic shock syndrome in

v. Playtex FP, Inc. 96 A woman died
1983, and her widower sued Playtex

in federal court in Kansas.97 The jury awarded compensatory and
punitive damages based on its finding that by 1983 Playtex knew or
should have known of the risks of its super-absorbent tampons.9s
Playtex then sued its liability insurer in Delaware state court, seek
ing reimbursement. The insurer, arguing that the policy should be
rescinded because Playtex fraudulently misrepresented the risk
associated with its tampons when it obtained coverage in

1984,

92. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
93. Compare Knoblauch v. Kenyon, 415 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing
defensive nonmutual issue preclusion) and Braxton v. Litchalk, 223 N.W.2d 316 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1974) (same) with Warda v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 533, 537-38 (6th Cir. 1994) ("Where
a party attempts offensive use of a previously litigated issue, Michigan law will give preclusive
effect to the prior determination only between those who were parties or their privies to the
previous suit."). The law in Michigan concerning mutuality is rather cloudy, however, and a
strand of Michigan cases appears to cling to the traditional mutuality rule, especially in cases
involving the preclusive effect of agency determinations. See Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 96
F.3d 813, 820-21 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying Michigan law to require mutuality for the issue
preclusive effect of an agency determination), vacated on other grounds, 106 F.3d 146 (6th
Cir. 1997) (en bane); Nummer v. Treasury Dept., 533 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Mich. 1995) (requir
ing mutuality for issue preclusion based on an agency determination); Couch v. Schultz, 439
N.W.2d 296, 297 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that mutuality is "a necessary element of
collateral estoppel'' in a case involving the effect of an agency determination); see also Lichon
v. American Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288, 298 & n.16 (Mich. 1990) (requiring mutual
ity but noting certain exceptions); Alterman v. Provizer, 491 N.W.2d 868, 869-70 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992) (applying an exception to the mutuality rule); Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66
U.S.L.W. 4060, 4068 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Nummer and
Lichon as requiring mutuality under Michigan law).

94. See Beaman Bottling Co. v. Bennett, No. 03A01-9103-CV-00091, 1991 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 843, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1991) ("While Tennessee courts have relaxed the
mutuality requirement in cases involving defensive collateral estoppel, they have not yet
adopted the federal practice of allowing offensive collateral estoppel."); Carroll v. Tunes
Printing Co., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1210, 1212 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) ("While the Restate
ment of Judgments, § 29, sanctions both offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel by
parties not involved in the previous determination, this jurisdiction has uniformly refused to
permit offensive application of the doctrine.").
95. See Herzog v. Lexington Township, 657 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Ill. 1995) (strongly caution
ing against allowing offensive nonmutual issue preclusion and declining to permit it under the
circumstances); Van Milligan v. Board ofFU"e & Police Commrs., 630 N.E.2d 830, 835-36 (Ill.
1994) (same); In re Owens, 532 N.E.2d 248, 251-52 (Ill. 1988) (same).
96. 584 A.2d 1214 (Del. 1991).
97. See 584 A.2d at 1215-16.
98. See 584 A.2d at 1216.
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asserted that the prior jury determination precluded Playtex from
relitigating the issue of Playtex's knowledge of the risk.99 Because
the insurer was not a party to the Kansas federal action, it sought to
use nonmutual issue preclusion. Both Delaware and federal law
permitted nonmutual preclusion, but Kansas law required mutual
ity. The Delaware court chose to apply Kansas preclusion law and
thus rejected the use of nonmutual issue preclusion.1°0 Had it ap
plied its own law, as many courts would have done,101 or federal
law, as I argue it should have done,102 the court could have given
nonmutual issue-preclusive effect to the Kansas federal court's
decision.

2. Alternative Holdings
Issue preclusion only applies to issues that are "essential to the
judgment."103 If a court offers alternative holdings to explain the
result in a particular case, is each alternative holding essential to the
judgment and thus entitled to issue-preclusive effect in subsequent
cases? Many, and perhaps most, federal courts give issue-preclu
sive effect to each alternative ground.104

Other courts and the

however, take the view that
each alternative holding is not essential to the judgment and there

Restatement (Second) of Judgments,

fore generally not entitled to issue-preclusive effect.1os
99. See 584 A.2d at 1216.
100. See 584 A.2d at 1217-19.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 316-31.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 301-15, 340-49.
103. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
104. See, e.g., Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. La Republica Argentina, 830 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th
Cir. 1987); Jn re Westgate-Calif. Corp., 642 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 1981); Wmters v.
Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1978); Sheldon Co. Profit Sharing Plan & Trust v. Smith,
858 F. Supp. 663, 669-70 (W.D. Mich. 1994); Clarke v. Carlucci, 834 F. Supp. 636, 641
(S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd., 29 F.3d 622 (2d Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Continental Cas. Co., 796 F. Supp.
1344, 1348 (D. Or. 1991). The First Restatement espoused this view. See REsrATEMENT
(FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 cmt n (1942). On the continuing vitality of this position in
federal decisions despite the Second Restatement's contrary view, see General Dynamics
Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 650 F. Supp. 1274, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("The majority
view is that all alternative, independent grounds upon which a court may base its decision
should be regarded as necessary for purposes of collateral estoppel."); Glictronix Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 603 F. Supp. 552, 566 (D.N.J. 1984) ("The clear majority view is
that a judgment is conclusive as to all issues that support all independent grounds on which
the judgment may be based."); 18 CHARI.Es ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4421, at n.20 (1981 & Supp. 1997).
105. See, e.g., Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 453-54 (8th Cir. 1997); Lisa Lee
Mines v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 86 F.3d 1358, 1363 (4th Cir.
1996) (en bane), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct 763 (1997); Baker Blee. Coop. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d
1466, 1475-76 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying North Dakota law); Arab African Intl. Bank v.
Epstein, 958 F.2d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying New Jersey law), revd. on other grounds,
10 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 1993); Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 814 F.2d 986, 993 (4th Cir.
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Guilty Pleas

A criminal conviction can carry issue-preclusive effect in a sub
sequent civil case. But what if the conviction was based on a guilty
plea, rather than trial and verdict? The issue can arise in an inten
tional tort personal injury or wrongful death suit following a de
fendant's plea of guilty to assault or homicide. It also can arise in a
civil fraud suit following a criminal fraud guilty plea. But it arises
most often in insurance coverage litigation; an insurer denies cover
age based on a "criminal act" or "intentional act" exclusionary
clause in the insurance policy, and the insurer asserts that a guilty
plea already has conclusively established the criminal act.106
In the federal courts, guilty pleas carry issue-preclusive effect.107
A

number

of

states

agree,

including

Colorado,1os

Iowa,109

Michigan,uo New York,111 and Oregon.112 Other states, however,
follow the

Second Restatement113 in refusing to give issue-preclusive

effect to a guilty plea, reasoning that issue preclusion applies only
to issues that have been actually litigated. These include Califor-

1987); Marathon Oil Co. v. Babbitt, 938 F. Supp. 575, 579 & n.9 (D. Alaska 1996); Vanover v.
Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 438 N.W.2d 524, 526 (N.D. 1989); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i {1982).
106. See, e.g., State Farm Frre & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1997); Ideal
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wmker, 319 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1982); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 481
N.E.2d 1356 {Mass. 1985); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sallak, 914 P.2d 697 {Or. Ct. App.),
review denied, 920 P.2d 551 (Or. 1996).
107. See Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 384; Gray v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 243, 246 {6th Cir.
1983); Fontneau v. United States, 654 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Bejar
Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1980).
108. See Colorado Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Snowbarger, 934 P.2d 909, 911 {Colo. Ct.
App. 1997).
109.
110.
1990).

See Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wmker, 319 N.W.2d 289, 291-96 {Iowa 1982).
See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 466 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Mich.

Ct. App.

111. See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arzillo, 472 N.Y.S.2d 97 {App. Div. 1984); Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 595 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1007-09 {Sup. Ct. 1993).
112.

denied,

See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sallak, 914 P.2d 697, 700 {Or. Ct. App.),
920 P.2d 551 (Or. 1996).

review

113. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 cmt. b (1982) (noting that issue pre
clusion "does not apply where the criminal judgment was based on a plea of no/o contendere
or a plea of guilty"). But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374, 379 (5th
Cir. 1997) (noting that the Second Restatement explicitly leaves open the possibility of "evi
dentiary estoppel'' to prevent defendant from later contesting elements underlying guilty
plea).
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nia,114 Massachusetts,115 New Jersey,116 and many others.117 Be
cause this divergence pits federal preclusion law against much state
law and the Second Restatement, 118 it is particularly ripe for federal
state interjurisdictional preclusion problems.

4.

Louisiana

Louisiana historically took an exceedingly narrow view of claim
preclusion and simply did not recognize issue preclusion. In keep
ing with its Napoleonic civil law tradition, Louisiana's codified
"civilian res judicata" provided for claim preclusion only when the
plaintiff sought the same relief and asserted the same cause of ac
tion.11 9 In other words, a plaintiff could not reassert the very same
lawsuit, but otherwise claim preclusion and issue preclusion were
essentially nonexistent. Naturally, interjurisdictlonal cases arose in
which the outcome depended on choice of preclusion law.120
In

1991, a new statute went into effect in Louisiana that substan

tially broadens Louisiana's doctrine of claim preclusion and estab
lishes the doctrine of issue preclusion in that state for the first time.
The statute establishes a transactional test for claim preclusion,
along the lines of federal law and the Restatement (Second) ofJudg
As to issue preclusion, the statute provides that: "A judg
ment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive,

ments.121

in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue
actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential
to that judgment."122 Because issue preclusion is so new in Louisi
ana,123 it is difficult to predict whether it will develop along the lines
114. See Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 375 P.2d 439, 441 (Cal. 1962).
115. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 481 N.E.2d 1356, 1362-64 (Mass. 1985).
116. See Eaton v. Eaton, 575 A.2d 858 (NJ. 1990); Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Kollar, 578 A.2d 1238 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
117. See Niziolek, 481 N.E.2d at 1363 n.6 (citing cases from 39 states holding that guilty
pleas, while admissible in evidence, are not conclusive as a matter of issue preclusion).
118. See Fullerton, 118 F.3d at 378, 381 (noting that case law from other jurisdictions "is
divided roughly evenly on the question" and that "nothing approaching a consensus has
emerged").
119. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bertolla, 340 So. 2d 287, 289-90 (La. 1976); Fitch v. Vmtage
Petroleum, Inc., 608 So. 2d 286, 288-89 (La. Ct. App. 1992).
120. See, e.g., Williams v. Divittoria, 760 F. Supp. 564, 566-67 (E.D. La. 1991) (applying
pre-1991 Louisiana law to reject claim preclusion and issue preclusion); Pille & Pille v. Metz,
547 So. 2d 1305, 1308-09 (La. 1989) (applying federal law to preclude).
121. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231(1)-(2) (West 1991); infra text accompanying
notes 135-37.
122. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231(3).
123. The statute applies only to cases filed after January 1, 1991. See 1990 La. Acts 521,
§ 5; Steptoe v. Lallie Kemp Hosp., 634 So. 2d 331, 335 (La. 1994). Only a handful of issue
preclusion cases invoking the statute have made their way into reported decisions. See, e.g.,
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of federal preclusion law and the Second Restatement or will de
velop with Napoleonic idiosyncrasies. The early cases under the
new statute suggest that some Louisiana judges may be reluctant to
use their new preclusion tools.124 On the question of mutuality, the
statutory language - "in any subsequent action between them"125
appears to require strict mutuality for issue preclusion, but that
too remains to be seen.
-

5. Finality
Fmally, both issue preclusion and claim preclusion require that
the initial action have resulted in a final judgment.126 How final is
final, however, is a point of disagreement. Federal preclusion law
provides that judgments are final pending appeal.127 The Second
Restatement agrees with the federal position that judgments are en
titled to claim-preclusive and issue-preclusive effect upon entry of
the judgment, regardless of whether the time to appeal has run, and
even if an appeal is pending.128 Several states, however, disagree.
First Natl. Bank v. Smith, 691 So. 2d 355, 357-58 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Goodman v. Spillers,
686 So. 2d 160, 166-67 (La. Ct. App. 1996), writ denied, 692 So. 2d 393 (La. 1997), writ denied,
692 So. 2d 400 (La. 1997); Oliver v. Department of Pub. Safety and Corrections, 669 So. 2d
570, 572 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 614 So. 2d 262 (La. 1996). None of the cases has raised
the question of nonmutual issue preclusion.
124. In Brouillard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 657 So. 2d 231, 232-33 (La. Ct. App.
1995), the court relied on a statutory "exceptional circumstances" exception to deny claim
preclusion in a second suit by an injured party against the premises insurer. The court ex
plained, "The doctrine of res judicata is interpreted stricti juris, and any doubt regarding
compliance with its requirements is to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff." 657 So. 2d at 233;
see also Jenkins v. Louisiana, 615 So. 2d 405, 406-07 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (relying on the
exceptional circumstances exception to deny claim preclusion, over a persuasive dissent that
no exceptional circumstances were presented). Another Louisiana court apparently was not
even aware of the new statute adopting issue preclusion. In a case filed after the statute's
effective date, the court held that collateral estoppel cannot apply because "Louisiana law,
for whatever reason, has steadfastly refused to accept that doctrine." Diez v. Daigle, 686 So.
2d 966, 969 (La. Ct. App. 1996); see also Spillers, 686 So. 2d at 167 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(declining to apply issue preclusion on the facts presented and stating that "[t]he doctrine of
res judicata cannot be invoked unless all essential elements are present and established beyond
all question").
125. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:4231(3) (emphasis added).
126. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 & cmt. k (1982); REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982).
127. See Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 F.2d 1493, 1497-98 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Under
well-settled federal law, the pendency of an appeal does not diminish the res judicata effect of
a judgment rendered by a federal court."); see also Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 199 (1932)
("(W]here a judgment in one case has successfully been made the basis for a judgment in a
second case, the second judgment will stand as res judicata, although the first judgment be
subsequently reversed.").
128. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. f (1982) ("The better view is
that a judgment otherwise final remains so despite the taking of an appeal unless what is
called an appeal actually consists of a trial de novo.").
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In California,129 Georgia,13o Oklahoma,131 Tennessee,132 Utah,133
and Washington,134 a judgment is not final for purposes of preclu
sion until either resolution of the appeal or expiration of the time
for appeal. Thus, if a judgment has been appealed, it will have

preclusive effect under the law of certain jurisdictions but not under
the law of other jurisdictions.
6.

Same Claim

The essential tenet of claim preclusion is that one cannot litigate
the same claim twice. But what does "same claim" mean? Courts
have developed various tests for determining whether the claim a
litigant seeks to assert in the second lawsuit is the same as the claim
asserted

in

the initial lawsuit.

The modem trend, supported by the

Second Restatement,

is to

apply a broad transactional test: a claim is precluded by a prior
judgment if the actions arise out of the same underlying transaction
or series of transactions.135 The federal courts136 and many state
courts131 apply transactional tests along these lines.
129. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CooE § 1049 (West 1980) (providing that "[a]n action is
deemed to be pending from the time of its co=encement until its final determination upon
appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner satisfied");
Kuykendall v. State Bd. of Equalization, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 789 (Ct. App. 1994); Sandoval
v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. Rptr. 29, 32 (Ct. App. 1983) ("California law is settled that pend
ing appeal a trial court judgment is not final and will not be given res judicata effect.").
130. See GA. CooE ANN. § 9-12-19 (1993); Reid v. Reid, 411 S.E.2d 754, 756 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1991); Lexington Developers, Inc. v. O'Neal Constr. Co., 238 S.E.2d 770, 771 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1977) ("In Georgia a judgment is suspended when an appeal is entered within the time
allowed. And the judgment is not final as long as there is a right to appellate review." (cita
tions omitted)).
131. See Grider v. USX Corp., 847 P.2d 779, 784 n.1 (Okla. 1993) ("[A]n order is not
'final'
for res judicata purposes, if a timely appeal of its correctness still pends."); Benham
v. Plotner, 795 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla. 1990).
. • .

132. See McBurney v. Aldrich, 816 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ("It is generally
agreed that a judgment is not final and res judicata where an appeal is pending.").
133. See Chavez v. Morris, 566 F. Supp. 359, 360 (D. Utah 1983); Young v. Hansen, 218
P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1950) ("[A] judgment is not final pending appeal and hence not admissi
ble as a bar to another action."). But see Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 227, 23031 (Utah 1992) (recognizing a split concerning finality pending appeal but declining to decide
the issue because it was unnecessary to the court's holding).
134. See Chau v. City of Seattle, 802 P.2d 822, 825 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) ("Normally,
finality [for purposes of issue preclusion] is conclusively established by a judgment on the
merits either by affirmation on appeal, or by expiration of the time to appeal.").
135.

See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).

136. See, e.g., Apparel Art Intl., Inc. v. Amertex Enters. Ltd., 48 F.3d 576, 583 (1st Cir.
1995); Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Energy Coop. Inc., 814 F.2d
1226, 1230-31 (7th Cir. 1987).
137. See, e.g., Aldape v. Akins, 668 P.2d 130, 134-35 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983); Beegan v.
Schmidt, 451 A.2d 642, 644-46 (Me. 1982).

Michigan Law Review

974

[Vol. 96:94S

Some state courts, however, have not adopted the broad defini
tion of a claim urged by the Second Restatement. Using various
phrasings, these courts have required a more particular connection
between the current claim and the prior claim than the connection
that the claims arose out of the same underlying factual circum
stances. Some look to whether the "same evidence" would suffice
to prove the prior and current claims.138 Others ask whether the
same "primary rights" are involved in the two actions.139 While
these phrasings allow ample room for reaching different conclu
sions in particular cases, and courts sometimes apply them much
like the transactional test, in general these phrasings suggest a nar
rower view of claim preclusion than the transactional test of the

Second Restatement.
The classic example comparing the broad and narrow definition
of a claim involves a plaintiff's assertion of personal injury and
property damage in separate lawsuits, usually following a motor
vehicle accident. Under federal and majority law, the later suit is
precluded because the claims arise out of the same transaction. 140
A few states, however, treat personal injury and property damage
as separate claims and thus allow their assertion in separate
lawsuits.141

7.

On the Merits

Claim preclusion also generally requires the prior judgment to
have been "on the merits." 142 No one disputes that a judgment
138. See, e.g., Benetton S.p.A. v. Benedot, Inc., 642 So. 2d 394, 399-402 (Ala. 1994);
Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 225, 228-30 (Ill. 1993) (denying claim
preclusion under the "same evidence" test); Agriserve, Inc. v. Belden, 643 N.E.2d 1193, 1194
(Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (granting claim preclusion under the "same evidence" test); Iowa Coal
Mining Co. v. Monroe County, SSS N.W.2d 418, 441-4S (Iowa 1996) (denying claim preclu
sion under the "same evidence" test); see also REsrATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 61
(1942) (generally adopting the "same evidence" test).
139.

See, e.g.,

Takahashi v. Board of Educ., 249

Cal.

Rptr. S78, S84-8S (Ct. App. 1988).

140. See, e.g., Parrell v. Keenan, 4S2 N.E.2d S06 (Mass. 1983); Rush v. City of Maple
Heights, 147 N.E.2d S99 (Ohio 19S8); Peterson v. Temple, 918 P.2d 413 (Or. 1996).
141. See, e.g., Holmes v. David H. Bricker, Inc., 4S2 P.2d 647, 649 (Cal. 1969); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 176 Cal. Rptr. S17, S20 (App. Dept. Super. Ct. 1981); American
States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 477 S.E.2d 360, 364 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (relying on a Georgia
statute defining motor vehicle personal injuries and property injuries as separate causes of
action); Childers v. F.A.F. Motor Cars, Inc., 319 S.E.2d 90, 91 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (same);
Stephan v. Yellow Cab Co., 333 N.E.2d 223, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 197S); see also Olsen v. Breeze,
Inc., SS Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 826-27 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that under California's "primary
rights" definition, personal injury and property damage are separate causes of action);
Andrea G. Nadel, Simultaneous Injury to Person and Property as Giving Rise to Single Cause
of Action - Modem Cases, 24 A.L.R.4TH 646 (1983 & Supp. 1997).
142. The Second Restatement avoids the phrase "on the merits" because it may be misun
derstood to refer only to judgments passing directly on the substance of a claim. Judgments
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entered after a full trial is on the merits. Nor would anyone dispute
that a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is not on the mer
its.143 In borderline cases, however, jurisdictions diverge.
The leading "on the merits" divergence concerns dismissals for
failure to state a claim. Under federal law, a dismissal for failure to
state a claim144 is treated as a judgment on the merits, unless the
court specifies otherwise.145 Many states agree,146 but other states
take the contrary position that such dismissals generally are not on
the merits. Demurrers or dismissals for failure to state a claim are
not on the merits - and therefore are not entitled to claim-preclu
sive effect unless the court specifies that the dismissal is with preju
dice
in the states of California,147 Connecticut,14s Georgia,149
-

not passing on the substance of a claim, such as defaultjudgments or dismissals for failure to
prosecute, may nevertheless carry claim·preclusive effect See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. a (1982).
143. Thus, if a Texas court dismisses a case against a New York defendant because Texas
lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the plaintiff can sue the defendant on the same
claim in New York without fear of claim preclusion based on the Texas dismissal. Of course,
this does not mean the plaintiff simply could sue again in Texas. If the plaintiff were to sue
the defendant on the same claim again in Texas, the prior determination of lack of personal
jurisdiction would be given binding effect under the doctrine of direct estoppel.
144. See FED. R. CIV P. 12(b)(6).
.

145. See FED. R. CIV P. 4l(b) ("Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule,
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a
party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits."); Federated Dept. Stores
v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981). To indicate that a dismissal is not on the merits, the
court can label it "without prejudice" or grant leave to amend.
.

146. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 19 cmt. d & reporter's note (1982);
18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 104, § 4439.
147. Although California courts state the general rule that dismissals for failure to state a
claim are on the merits, the exceptions in California appear to have displaced the rule. In
Kanarek v. Bugliosi, 166 Cal. Rptr. 526 (Ct. App. 1980), for example, a California court
stated that "a demurrer which is sustained for failure of the facts alleged to establish a cause
of action, is a judgment on the merits. However, this is true only if the same facts are
pleaded in the second action, or if, although different facts are pleaded, the new complaint
contains the same defects as the former." 166 Cal. Rptr. at 530 (citations omitted); cf.
Keidatz v. Albany, 249 P.2d 264, 265 (Cal. 1952) ("If . . new or additional facts are alleged
that cure the defects in the original pleading, it is settled that the former judgment is not a
bar to the subsequent action whether or not plaintiff had an opportunity to amend his com
plaint."); Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 92 P.2d 804, 806·07 (Cal. 1939) (stating
that although a demurrer is on the merits, it does not bar a subsequent action where suffi
cient facts are alleged in the second suit). It thus appears that California gives only direct
estoppel effect - rather than claim-preclusive effect - to dismissals based on a complaint's
insufficiency.
.

148. See Gottlob v. Connecticut State Univ., No. CV 930521148$, 1996 WL 57087 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 1996); Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., No. CV92 517506S, 1995 WL
216835 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1995), affd., 687 A.2d 111 (Conn. 1996).
149. See Buie v. Waters, 74 S.E.2d 883, 884-85 (Ga. 1953) ("[W]here a general demurrer
that does not go to the merits of the cause of action is sustained, the judgment will not be res
adjudicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same cause of action.");
Keith v. Darby, 122 S.E.2d 463, 463 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961).
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Illinois, 1 50 Maryland, 1 51 Massachusetts,1 52 Minnesota, 153 New
York,154 and Oregon.155 Whenever a court dismisses a complaint
for failure to state a claim and does not specify whether the dismis
sal is with prejudice, the claim-preclusive effect depends upon
whether the applicable preclusion law is that of the nine states men
tioned above156 or the preclusion law of some other jurisdiction.157

150. See In re Estate of Cochrane, 391 N.E.2d 35, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that
where the dismissal could have been based on either a pleading defect or a substantive lack
of claim, "the respondents bear the burden of proving that the order dismissing the petition
was based on the merits"). But see ILL. S. CT. R. 273 (following the language of FEo. R. CIV.
P. 4l(b)).
151. See Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 297 A.2d 721, 726 (Md. 1972) ("'A judgment
or decree of dismissal after demurrer sustained because the plaintiff's pleading does not state
a cause of action does not bar a new action on sufficient pleadings."' (quoting 2 A.C.
FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 748 (5th ed. 1925))).
152. In Massachusetts, a demurrer is deemed on the merits only if the plaintiff is granted
leave to amend and then fails to amend; otherwise, a demurrer generally is not on the merits
and does not bar a second action for the same claim. See Hacker v. Beck, 91 N.E.2d 832, 834
(Mass. 1950); Sullivan v. Farr, 309 N.E.2d 508 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974); see also O'Brien v.
Hessman, 114 N.W.2d 834 {WIS. 1962) (following a similar rule).
153. See H. Christiansen & Sons, Inc. v. City of Duluth, 31 N.W.2d 277, 279-80 (Minn.
1948) ("Judgment of dismissal on the merits based upon the trial court's order sustaining
defendant's general demurrer of course does not constitute a bar to a subsequent action by
plaintiff based upon a complaint for the same cause, but alleging facts which . • • set forth a
valid cause of action."); Rost v. Kroke, 262 N.W. 450, 451 (Minn. 1935) ("(I]f the plaintiff
fails on demurrer in his first action from the omission of an essential allegation . . . the
judgment in the first suit is no bar to the second . . . for the reason that the merits of the cause
. . . were not heard and decided in the first action.").
154. See Amsterdam Sav. Bank v. Marine Midland Bank, 528 N.Y.S.2d 184 (App. Div.
1988); Allston v. Incorporated Village of Rockville Centre, 267 N.Y.S.2d 564, 565-66 (App.
Div. 1966) ("[D]ismissal . . . for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
. . . is not on the merits and does not bar another action brought for the same cause." (cita
tions omitted)).
155. See Briggs v. Bramley, 177 F. Supp. 599, 600 (D. Or. 1959) (relying in part on
Oregon preclusion law and holding that "[a] judgment rendered because of defective plead
ings is not considered to be a judgment on the merits within the operation of the res judicata
doctrine"); O'Hara v. Parker, 39 P. 1004, 1005 (Or. 1895).
156. Although these states adhere to the "minority view," they do not represent a trivial
component of U.S. law practice. These nine states contain over 40% of the nation's active
lawyers. See AMERICAN BAR AssN., LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- AN EDUCATIONAL CoNTINUUM 15-16 (1992) (listing the estimated total number of active
resident attorneys in each jurisdiction as of December 1990-January 1991).
157. In Gottlob v. Connecticut State University, No. CV 930521148S, 1996 WL 57087
(Conn. Super.' Ct. Jan. 19, 1996), for example, the plaintiff first sued in federal court on a First
Amendment claim, and the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Gottlob,
1996 WL 57087, at *4. The plaintiff, undaunted, sued in Connecticut state court. The state
court, following Connecticut preclusion law, held that the federal dismissal was not on the
merits and therefore no bar to the subsequent action. See Gottlob, 1996 WL 57087, at *4.

Interjurisdictional Preclusion

February 1998]

977

Dismissals for failure to prosecute are treated as �·on the merits"
under federal law unless the dismissal order specifies otherwise,158
but some states do not give preclusive effect to such dismissals.159

8.

Counterclaims

In the federal courts, a counterclaim is compulsory if it arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's
claim.160 If a party fails to assert a compulsory counterclaim, the
party is precluded from asserting that claim in a separate lawsuit.161
Most states have adopted compulsory counterclaim rules virtually
identical to the federal rule.162
Nine states, however, have no compulsory counterclaim rule.163
They are Connecticut,164 Illinois,165 Maryland,166 Nebraska,167 New
158. See FED. R. Crv. P. 41(b); Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., 992 F.2d 100, 104 (7th
Cir. 1993); Landon v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 832-33 (3d Cir. 1992).
159. See, e.g., McCarter v. Mitcham, 883 F.2d 196, 199-200 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Harl v. City of La Salle, 679 F.2d 123, 125-28 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1982) (apply
ing Illinois law). In Har� the federal courts allowed a subsequent claim after an Illinois state
court dismissal for failure to prosecute, because Illinois law does not deem such dismissals to
be on the merits. See 679 F.2d at 125-28 & n.4 (citing O'Reilly v. Gerber, 420 N.E.2d 425 (IlL
App. Ct 1981)). In Jenkins v. State, 615 So. 2d 405 (La. Ct App. 1993), the plaintiff's action
was removed from Louisiana state court to federal court, the plaintiff's motion to remand
failed, and the suit ultimately was dismissed from federal court for failure to prosecute. The
plaintiff refiled in Louisiana state court. The state court held that the federal dismissal did
not bar the subsequent state court action, under Louisiana's "exceptional circumstances"
statutory exception to res judicata. See 615 So. 2d at 405-06. Under federal preclusion law, it
seems likely that the second suit would have been precluded.
160.

See FED.

R.

Crv. P.

13(a).

161. See Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.1 (1974). It is questionable
whether the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994), permits federal rules directly to
govern preclusive effect The claim-preclusive effect of the compulsory counterclaim rule can
be understood as common law "defense preclusion" that incorporates the requirement of the
compulsory counterclaim rule. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(2) (1982);
Burbank, supra note 1, at 771-75. For a discussion of the interjurisdictional treatment of
compulsory counterclaim rules, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Linda J. Silberman,
lnterjurisdictional Implications ofthe Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS LJ. 123, 16061 (1996).
162. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. PROC. CoDE § 426.30 (West 1980); Omo REv. CODE ANN. Crv.
R. 13(A); TEX. R. Crv. P. 97. See generally John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal
Rules in State Courts: A Survey ofState Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv.
1367 (1986).
163. It is important to note that even without a specific rule governing compulsory coun
terclaims, some counterclaims can be subject to the common law of claim preclusion. See
Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir. 1979); Torcasso v. Standard
Outdoor Sales, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 225, 228-30 (Ill. 1993); Henry Modell & Co. v. Minister, 502
N.E.2d 978, 980 (N.Y. 1986).
164.
165.
166.
167.

See CoNN. R. SUPER. Cr. Crv. 116.
See ILL. CoDE Crv. P. 5/2-608(a).
See MD. R. Crv. P. 2-331(a).
See NEB. R. Crv. P. 25-812, 25-813.
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York,16s Oregon,169 Pennsylvania,170 Virginia,171 and Wisconsin.1 12
Michigan has adopted a unique twist: No counterclaims are com
pulsory initially, but if a counterclaim is asserted, then the counter
claim pleader must join all other claims that arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the original action.113
Seven states have largely adopted the federal compulsory coun
terclaim rule but have added important exceptions. In Tennessee,
tort counterclaims are not compulsory.174 In Alabama, Mississippi,
and Vermont, counterclaims are not compulsory if the plaintiff's
claim is for damage covered by liability insurance and the insurer is
entitled or obliged to conduct the defense.175 Presumably, these
three states reason that when a liability insurer handles the defense
on behalf of the defendant, it is unfair to penalize the defendant for
failing to assert a counterclaim because the defendant may have lit
tle involvement in the conduct of the litigation. In Maine and
Rhode Island, counterclaims are not compulsory if the plaintiff's
claim is for damages involving a motor vehicle.176 Finally, a Massa
chusetts counterclaim is not compulsory if it is "based upon prop
erty damage arising out of a collision, personal injury, including
actions for consequential damages, or death." 177
168. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3019{a) (McKinney 1991). The New York courts have empha
sized, however, that res judicata sometimes can apply despite New York's lack of a compul
sory counterclaim rule. See Model� 502 N.E.2d at 980 {"While New York does not have a
compulsory counterclaim rule, a party is not free to remain silent in an action in which he is
the defendant and then bring a second action seeking relief inconsistent with the judgment in
the first action by asserting what is simply a new legal theory." (citation omitted)).
169. See OR. R. CIV. P. 22{A){l).
170. See PA. R. CIV. P. 103l{a), 1510(a); Hunsicker v. Brearman, 586 A.2d 1387, 1390
{Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) {"In Pennsylvania, unlike the federal system, there is no compulsory
counterclaim rule." (quoting Martin v. Poole, 336 A.2d 363, 366 {Pa. Super. Ct. 1975)).
171. See VA. R. S. CT. 3:8.
172. See Wis. STAT. § 802.07(1) {1975). But see Green Spring Farms v. Spring Green
Farm Assocs., 492 N.W.2d 392, 395 (WIS. Ct. App. 1992) {holding that the "common-law
compulsory counterclaim rule" applies if the second action would nullify the initial
judgment).
173. See MICH. CT. R. 2.203{A){l); see also Oakley & Coon, supra note 162, at 1403
n.208. Even in states without a compulsory counterclaim rule, a defendant who asserts a
permissive counterclaim thereby subjects herself to the ordinary rules of claim preclusion,
and must assert or forgo whatever else forms part of the "same claim" as the permissive
counterclaim. But Michigan's rule differs from the other states in that Michigan's rule appar
ently requires a defendant, upon asserting a permissive counterclaim, to assert claims related
to the plaintiffs original claim.
174. See TENN. R.

CIV.

P. 13.01.

� � � R. � � �� � R. � � �� � R. � � ��
176. See ME. R.
177. MAss. R.

CIV.

CIV.

P. 13{a){l); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 13{a).

P. 13{a).
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Preservation of Objection to Claim-Splitting

In Michigan, claim preclusion generally applies only if the party
asserting preclusion objected to the omission of the claim in the
original action. Michigan achieves this by a court rule establishing
compulsory joinder of claims. Specifically, Michigan Court Rule
2.203(A) ("Compulsory Joinder") provides that a pleading assert
ing a claim must assert every claim the party has against the oppos
ing party arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,178 and
then states:
Failure to object in a pleading, by motion, or at a pretrial conference
to improper joinder of claims or failure to join claims required to be
joined constitutes a waiver of the joinder rules, and the judgment shall
only merge the claims actually litigated. This rule does not affect col
lateral estoppel or the prohibition against relitigation of a claim under
a different theory.179

This unique rule makes explicit what is implicit everywhere else that claim preclusion functions as a rule of compulsory joinder. It
also puts the burden on the defendant to decide, at the time of the
initial lawsuit, whether the plaintiff has transactionally related
claims that should be asserted at the same time.180

10.

The Entire Controversy Doctrine and the One-Action Rule

The most peculiar state variation of res judicata is a bundle of
New Jersey claim preclusion rules known as the "entire controversy
doctrine." The gnarly tree of the entire controversy doctrine grew
from an acorn in New Jersey's 1947 Constitution, which allowed the
Superior Court's Law and Chancery Divisions to grant both legal
178. See MICH. CT. R. 2.203(A)(1).
179. MICH. CT. R. 2.203(A){2).
180. The rule's effect may be described as hastening the moment of waivability of the
defense of claim preclusion. In general, res judicata is an affirmative defense, waivable by
the defendant at the time of the second action. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 8(c). Under the
Michigan rule, waiver by the defendant can occur during the first action. See Rogers v.
Colonial Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 275 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1979) {"The only innovative
aspect of the rule's waiver provision is that a defendant must now assert his or her objection
during the first suit when there exists an opportunity for plaintiff to cure the non-joinder
defect."). Another way to describe the rule's effect - probably more in line with litigators'
perceptions - is that at the time of the first action, it shifts the burden from the plaintiff to
the defendant to decide what claims need to be asserted.
With this waiver rule - little known outside the state - Michigan has taken a sensible
step toward reducing the unfairness and surprise that sometimes accompany claim preclu
sion. The waiver rule may be less significant than it appears, however, because Michigan
courts have relied on the final sentence of Rule 2.203(A)(2) in applying claim preclusion to
prevent "relitigation of a claim under a different theory." See, e.g., Falk v. State Bar, 631 F.
Supp. 1515, 1521-22 (W.D. Mich. 1986), affd., 815 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1987); Board of County
Rd. Commrs. v. Schultz, 521 N.W.2d 847, 852 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Jones v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 N.W.2d 829, 836 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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and equitable relief "so that all matters in controversy between the
parties may be completely determined. "181 The doctrine has
evolved into a broad set of claim preclusion rules that require a
litigant to assert all transactionally related claims in a single action.
As to joinder of claims or counterclaims among present parties, the
doctrine largely mirrors federal claim preclusion doctrine and the
federal compulsory counterclaim rule. The entire controversy doc
trine, however, goes further. Not only are related counterclaims
compulsory, but so are related cross-claims against coparties.182

More significant, if a plaintiff fails to assert a related claim against a
nonparty, that claim later may be precluded.183 Thus, the entire
controversy doctrine imposes mandatory party joinder, enforced
through claim preclusion.
The entire controversy doctrine has figured prominently in
interjurisdictional preclusion cases. Consider the case of Mortgage

linq Corporation v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Com
pany. 184 Plaintiffs Mortgagelinq, a mortgage lender, and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), the as-

181. N.J. CoNST.

art. VI,

§ 3, 'lI 4.

182. See NJ. CT. R. 4:7-5(a) (making cross-claims "subject to the mandatory joinder pro
visions of R. 4:30A"); Wm. Blanchard Co. v. Beach Concrete Co., 375 A.2d 675, 684 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). Under the federal rules, by contrast, there are compulsory coun
terclaims but no compulsory cross-claims. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (compulsory coun
terclaims) with FED. R. CIV. P. 13(g) (permissive cross-claims).
183. See Cogdell v. Hospital Ctr., 560 A.2d 1169, 1178 (N.J. 1989) ("[W]e now hold that
to the extent possible courts must determine an entire controversy in a single judicial pro
ceeding and that such a determination necessarily embraces not only joinder of related claims
between the parties but also joinder of all persons who have a material interest in the contro
versy."). The entire controversy doctrine's mandatory party joinder component has since
been codified as a civil practice rule, but its development is left largely to case law. See N.J.
Cr. R. 4:30A ("Non-joinder of claims or parties required to be joined by the entire contro
versy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by
the entire controversy doctrine . . . . "). This preclusion-based mandatory party joinder doc
trine supplements a more familiar mandatory party joinder rule for necessary parties along
the lines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. See NJ. CT. R. 4:28-1.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently indicated a willingness to reconsider the merits
of such mandatory party joinder and asked the state's Civil Practice Committee to make
recommendations concerning the doctrine. See Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633, 643-46 (N.J.
1997).
184. 662 A.2d 536 (NJ. 1995). The Mortgagelinq case has spawned a significant body of
commentary, most of it - appropriately, in my view - highly critical. See, e.g., Burbank,
supra note 18, at 90-91; Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 137; Jonathan Neal Marcus,
Survey, Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 26 SETON HALL L. REv.
485, 489-90 (1995). Even in a wholly domestic context, the entire controversy doctrine's
mandatory party joinder has been widely criticized by the bar, the bench, and the academy.
See, e.g., Editorial: Entire Controversy, supra note 69. The most compelling argument
against it was offered by Professor Allan Stein. See Allan R. Stein, Commentary: Power,
Duty and the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 27 (1996).
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signee of some of the loans,185 sued several Pennsylvania defend
ants for fraud in federal court in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. While that federal action was pending, the plaintiffs
filed an action in New Jersey state court against several New Jersey
title insurers who allegedly were involved in the fraudulent
scheme.186 The New Jersey court applied the entire controversy
doctrine and dismissed Mortgagelinq's and Freddie Mac's claims
against the New Jersey defendants. The dismissal was upheld by
the New Jersey Supreme Court.187 Had the second action been
filed in federal court, or had the New Jersey courts applied federal
preclusion law, the claims against the New Jersey defendants would
not have been precluded, because federal preclusion law does not
include mandatory party joinder.188
The only other state to incorporate mandatory party joinder
into its preclusion law189 is Kansas. Kansas's version - known as
the "one-action rule"190 - is milder than the New Jersey version, in
that the Kansas one-action rule applies only in comparative negli
gence cases.191 In fact, the one-action rule is the Kansas Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Kansas comparative negligence stat
ute.192 In the absence of a prior comparative fault determination,
the rule does not apply.193 Like New Jersey's entire controversy
doctrine, the Kansas one-action rule includes not only mandatory
185. Freddie Mac was not an original plaintiff, but intervened as a plaintiff in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania suit. See Mortgagelinq, 662 A.2d at 538.
186. See 662 A.2d at 538.
187. See 662 A.2d at 539-42.
188. For other interjurisdictional preclusion cases raising the entire controversy doctrine,
see Giudice v. Drew Chem. Corp., 509 A.2d 200 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert granted and
summarily remanded on other grounds, 511 A.2d 448 (NJ. 1986); Gross v. Cohen DuFour &
Assocs., 642 A.2d 1074 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); Kimmins Abatement Corp. v. Cones
toga-Rovers & Assocs., 601 A.2d 256 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
189. One might question whether New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine and Kansas's
one-action rule are truly rules of "preclusion" rather than rules of "joinder" or some other
label. This article's discussion encompasses any rule - regardless of label - by which con
sideration of claims or issues may be foreclosed based on a prior adjudication.
190. Some refer to it as the "one-trial rule." See, e.g., Griffin & Reitz, supra note 36, at
27; see also Mick v. Mani, 766 P.2d 147, 156 (Kan. 1988) (asserting that "the one-action rule
should, perhaps, more accurately be described as the one-trial rule").
191. See Mick, 766 P.2d 147; Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d
1127 (Kan. 1981).
192. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1987); Mick, 766 P.2d at 150-51 (reviewing the one
action rule's development as a reading of the Kansas legislature's intent in enacting § 60258a).
193. See Mick, 766 P.2d at 156 ("[A] plaintiff may pursue separate actions against
tortfeasors where there has been no judicial determination of comparative fault.").
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joinder of parties, but also mandatory cross-claims among co
parties.1 94

Tersiner v. Gretencord19S

provides an example of an interjuris

dictional application of the one-action rule.

Plaintiff Tersiner

slipped and fell at a service station while on the job.196 He sued his
employer, Union Pacific Railroad, in a Federal Employers' Liability
Act claim in federal court.197 The federal court did not allow
Tersiner to assert a pendent party claim against Gretencord, the
owner of the service station, but it allowed Union Pacific to main
tain a third-party claim against Gretencord for comparative implied
indemnity under Kansas law.1 98 The jury apportioned fault among
Tersiner (66%), Union Pacific (17%), and Gretencord (17%). 199
The court entered judgment for Tersiner against Union Pacific but
rejected Union Pacific's comparative indemnity claim against
Gretencord.200 Subsequently, Tersiner sued Gretencord for negli
gence in Kansas state court. The Kansas court dismissed the claim
under the one-action rule, holding that despite Tersiner's inability
to pursue his claim against Gretencord in the federal action, that
claim now was precluded because there had been a comparative
fault determination.201 "Tersiner had a strategic election to make,"
the appellate court explained in affirming the dismissal; rather than
194. See KAN Cw. PRoc. CooE .ANN § 60-213(g) (West 1994) ("Compulsory Cross
Claim Against Co-party. In an action involving a claim governed by K.S.A. 60-258a and
amendments thereto, a party shall state as a cross-claim any claim that party has against any
co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the claim
governed by K.S.A. 60-258a and amendments thereto."); Teepak, Inc. v. Learned, 699 P.2d 35
(Kan. 1985).
195. 840 P.2d 544 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992).
196. For underlying facts, see Tersiner v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 90-3361, 1991 WL
225897 (10th Cir. Oct. 30, 1991} (unpublished opinion).
197. See Tersiner v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 754 F. Supp. 177 (D. Kan. 1990), affd., 941 F.2d
954 (10th Cir. 1991}.
198. See 154 F. Supp. at 177-78. Tersiner's state law claim against Gretencord was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 154 F. Supp. at 177-78.
199. See 154 F. Supp. at 178.
200. See 154 F. Supp. at 178-79.
201. See Tersiner v. Gretencord, 840 P.2d 544, 546-47 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). The court
emphasized that "Gretencord is not contending Tersiner's claim is barred by res judicata or
collateral estoppel, but by the provisions of the Kansas Comparative Negligence Act." 840
P.2d at 546. It nevertheless appears that issue preclusion (collateral estoppel} would have
provided an alternative basis for defeating Tersiner's claim against Gretencord. Tersiner and
Gretencord were both parties to the prior federal action and thus were bound by the jury's
determination of fault. If that factual determination, as a matter of issue preclusion, were
taken as conclusive in the subsequent suit, then Tersiner's claim would fail under Kansas
comparative fault law, which allows recovery only if the plaintiff is less than 50% at fault. See
KAN STAT .ANN § 60-258a (1987) ("The contributory negligence of any party in a civil ac
tion shall not bar such party . . . from recovering damages for negligence . . . if such party's
negligence was less than the causal negligence of the party or parties against whom claim for
recovery is made . . . . "). Because the federal jury found Tersiner 66% at fault, issue preclu.

.

.
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lose his claim against Gretencord, "[h]e could have dismissed his
federal action and instituted a claim against both the railroad and
Gretencord in state court."202
Ill.

CHOICE OF PRECLUSION LAW:

LEGAL ANALYSIS

In light of the preclusion law divergences discussed above, we
now turn to an analysis of whose preclusion law ought to apply in
interjurisdictional preclusion cases - that is, cases in which F2, the
forum of the lawsuit in which preclusion is asserted, differs from Fi.
the forum of the initial lawsuit in which the potentially preclusive
judgment was rendered. Plausible sources of preclusion law might
include the preclusion law of F1;203 the preclusion law of F2; the
preclusion law of the jurisdictions whose substantive law governed
at F1 or at F2; or the preclusion law of the state in which F1 or F2 sits,
if either is a federal court sitting in diversity. It is my contention
that the appropriate choice in nearly every circumstance is the pre
clusion law of F1• Before exploring these options, I briefly examine
the legal foundation for interjurisdictional preclusion.
·

A.

Legal Foundation for Interjurisdictional Preclusion204

The root of American interjurisdictional preclusion is the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, which
provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State."205 The Full Faith and Credit Clause, by referring to "judi
cial Proceedings, " requires each state to respect judgments ren
dered by other state courts. Pursuant to this constitutional clause,
Congress in 1790 enacted the full faith and credit statute, requiring
respect for the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of states, ter
ritories, and possessions of the United States.206
sion would destroy his subsequent state court claim, even in the absence of the one-action
rule.

202 Tersiner, 840 P.2d at 547.
203. By "the preclusion law of F"" I

am referring to F1's domestic preclusion law, and
not, in conflict of laws parlance, to F1's "whole law," which might incorporate by reference
some other jurisdiction's preclusion law.

204. This background has been covered well by others, see Burbank, supra note 1, at 73940, 797-805; Degnan, supra note 1, at 742-45; a brief rendition should suffice for our purposes.
205. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1; see also Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060,
4063 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1998) {describing the purpose of full faith and credit as to alter the status
of the states as independent sovereigns " 'and to make them integral parts of a single nation'"
(quoting Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 {1935))); Magnolia Petro
leum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 {1943) (emphasizing the importance of full faith and
credit as a "nationally unifying force").

206. The current version of the statute is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
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In the state-state interjurisdictional configuration - in which F1
is one state court and F2 is a different state court - a judgment's
binding effect is founded both on the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and on the corresponding statute. In the state-federal configuration
- in which F1 is a state court and F2 is a federal court - a judg
ment's binding effect is based on the statute alone, because the con
stitutional clause, by its terms, applies only to the effect of state
court judgments in other state courts.201
What about the federal-state configuration? Are state courts
obligated to give preclusive effect to the judgments of federal
courts? The Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute do not impose
such an obligation, but commentators have offered compelling ar
guments that state courts have a federal obligation to respect fed
eral court judgments.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause speaks only of the judicial pro
ceedings "of every other state" and 'mandates that full faith and
credit be given "in each State."2os By its terms, the constitutional
clause does not address federal courts at all. The full faith and
credit statute brings federal courts into the picture, but only as F2,
the forum of the subsequent action, and not as Fi, the forum of the
prior action. The statute provides that
judicial proceedings [of any State, Territory, or Possession of the
United States] . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or
Possession from which they are taken.209

Because federal courts are included in "every court within the
United States," the full faith and credit statute requires them to
give full faith and credit to judicial proceedings. The judicial proAficionados of criminal procedure may wonder about the contrast between full faith and
credit and double jeopardy. Full faith and credit mandates interjurisdictional preclusion, but
there is no interjurisdictional double jeopardy. Under the "dual sovereignty doctrine," the
federal government can prosecute a defendant who has already been tried by a state for the
same crime. Likewise, a state can prosecute despite a prior prosecution by the federal au
thorities. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (state-federal); Bartkus v. Illinois,
359 U.S. 121 (1959) (federal-state). Although the dual sovereignty doctrine appears to con
tradict the policy of full faith and credit, it can be understood simply as an instance of not
binding a nonparty, rather than as a refusal to give interjurisdictional effect to judicial pro
ceedings. The second prosecuting sovereign is not the same party as, nor in privity with, the
first prosecuting sovereign. Under standard res judicata and full faith and credit principles,
the second prosecuting government therefore would not be bound. Alternatively, the dual
sovereignty doctrine can be understood as analogous to the res judicata principle that claim
preclusion generally does not apply to claims that could not have been adjudicated in the
prior forum.
207.

See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
IV, § 1.
28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1994).

208. U.S. CoNST. art
209.
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ceedings to which full faith and credit must be given, however, in
clude only those "of any State, Territory, or Possession of the
United States," and not, according to the statutory language, judi
cial proceedings of the United States itself. Thus, the statute ap
plies by its terms to state-state interjurisdictional preclusion and to
state-federal preclusion, but not to federal-state preclusion.
Despite the clear language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and its implementing statute, some early cases point to those au
thorities as the basis for federal-state preclusion.21° Modem com
mentators uniformly discredit these cases, not for their result, but
for their apparently unthinking misreading of the terms of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and statute.211 But still the cases stand,
with their references to full faith and credit not yet overruled. If,
on grounds of stare decisis, Hancock National Bank and the other
early full faith and credit cases are treated as good law, problems of
federal-state interjurisdictional preclusion are simplified somewhat.
On the other hand, it is difficult to defend a statutory reading so
210. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111,
129 (1912) (considering federal-state preclusion under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and
statute and holding that a federal judgment "is entitled to the same sanction which would
attach to a like judgment of a court of the State"); Hancock Natl. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S.
640, 645 (1900) (asserting, after invoking the constitutional and statutory full faith and credit
rule for state-state preclusion, that "[t]he fact that this judgment was rendered in a court of
the United States, sitting within the State of Kansas, instead of one of the state courts, is
immaterial"); Phoenix Frre & Marine Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 174, 185 (1896) (ex
plaining that "the Constitution provides that full faith and credit shall be given" to federal
court judgments); Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1883) (looking to the statute alone as a
basis for federal-state preclusion); see also Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265
U.S. 30, 33 (1924) (citing Hancock National Bank and Embry for the rule of federal-state
preclusion); National Foundry & Pipe Works v. Oconto Water Supply Co., 183 U.S. 216, 233
(1902) (holding that a state tribunal's failure to give due effect to a federal court decree
raised a federal question, citing, among other things, a state-state case in which preclusion
was founded on the Full Faith and Credit Clause (citing Jacobs v. Marks, 182 U.S. 583, 587
(1901))).
More recently, a Louisiana court reluctantly gave issue-preclusive effect to a federal judg
ment because, in the court's view, that result was compelled by section 1738: "[U]nder the
federal full faith and credit statute we are bound to follow collateral estoppel in the instant
case. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires each state to give the same effect to the judg
ments of state and federal courts as those judgments have in the jurisdiction where ren
dered." Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas 'fransmission Corp., 176 So. 2d 692, 696 (La. Ct. App.
1965); see also Hazen Research, Inc. v. Omega Minerals, Inc., 497 F.2d 151, 153 n.1 (5th Cir.
1974) (noting that courts have read "into § 1738 a requirement that state courts extend full
respect to the judgments of federal judicial tribunals within the states"); 'fransamerica Trade
Co. v. McCollum Aviation, Inc., 424 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) ("Valid judgments of
Federal courts, just as valid judgments of state courts, must be given full faith and credit . . . ."
(citing U.S. CoNST. art IV and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1980))).
211. See, e.g., 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 104, § 4466, at 621; id. § 4468, at 651 ("On
the face of the statute, this conclusion is preposterous."); Burbank, supra note 1, at 740-47;
Lilly, supra note 18, at 291, 315 ("On its face, Section 1738 applies only when the initial
judgment is given in a state court. . . . [I]t is difficult to believe that if the question were
squarely put today, the Supreme Court would find that the statute controlled federal
judgments.").

986
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plainly contrary to the text, particularly given the lack of attention
to statutory or constitutional interpretation in the cases. While the
cases stake out a clear and defensible legal position that state courts
are bound to give due effect to federal court judgments, their reli
ance on full faith and credit takes the form of offhand cites to the
clause and statute rather than careful attention to constitutional or
statutory construction.212
If the constitutional and statutory full faith and credit provisions
do not apply, should federal-state preclusion be considered simply a
matter of state law? No doubt each state tribunal, left to its own
devices, ordinarily would choose to give due effect to federal judg
ments.213 If a state court ever failed to do so, however, it is incon
ceivable that the United States Supreme Court would be powerless
to reverse,214 and commentators have offered sound explanations
212. See Bigelow, 225 U.S. at 129; Hancock Natl. Bank, 176 U.S. at 645; Phoenix Fire &
Marine, 161 U.S. at 185; Embry, 107 U.S. at 9-10. One cure for the confusion surrounding
state courts' obligation to respect federal judgments would be to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to
cover the federal-state configuration. See infra text accompanying note 350 (proposing such
an amendment).
213. State courts take it as axiomatic that they must accord preclusive effect to federal
court judgments. See, e.g., Younger v. Jensen, 605 P.2d 813, 822 (Cal. 1980); Watkins v.
Resorts Intl. Hotel & Casino, 591 A.2d 592, 598 (NJ. 1991); Bardo v. Commonwealth Dept.
of Pub. Welfare, 397 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979); see also Degnan, supra note 1,
at 744-45 n.17 (citing early cases reciting this rule). Some states establish the binding effect of
federal judgments by statute. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CooE §§ 1908-1909 (West 1980);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5401 (McKinney 1991) (defining "foreign judgment," for purposes of enforce
ment proceedings, as "any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of
any other court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state"). Interestingly, the New
York provision appears to be based on an assumption that "full faith and credit" encom
passes federal judgments.
214. In fact, despite the Court's unclear and unconvincing explanations in the early cases
based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute, the Court in those cases made one
thing perfectly clear: a state court's failure to give preclusive effect to a federal judgment was
reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court and would result in reversal. See Hancock Natl. Bank,
176 U.S. at 645 ("We are of the opinion, therefore, that the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
has failed to give to the judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Kansas that force and effect which it has within the limits of the State of Kansas, and that the
failure so to do is an error available in this court. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island must, therefore, be reversed . . . ."); Embry, 107 U.S. at 19 ("In restraining
further proceedings upon [the federal judgment], the Supreme Court of Errors of [Connecti
cut] have not given it that due effect to which, under the authority of the Constitution and
laws of the United States, it is entitled. In that respect there is manifest error in its decree, to
the prejudice of the plaintiff in error, for which it must be reversed . . . ."). If the U.S.
Supreme Court has power to reverse a state court failure to respect a federal judgment, then
federal-state preclusion must be an obligation under federal law, because the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to review state court decisions is limited to issues of federal law. See 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1994); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 409 (1994) (noting that the issue-preclu
sive effect of a federal judgment in a subsequent state court proceeding presents a federal
question); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 167 (1938); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S.
499, 514-15 (1903) ("[W]hether a Federal judgment has been given due force and effect in the
state court is a Federal question reviewable by this court
"). While I find the Court's
reading of full faith and credit indefensible, I agree with the Court's implicit understanding
that federal-state preclusion presents a federalism issue of constitutional dimensions.
.

.

•
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for imposing a federal-state preclusion obligation on the states as a
matter of federal law.
In his

1976 article, Federalized Res Judicata,215 Professor Ronan

Degnan powerfully advanced the argument that Article III of the
United States Constitution obligates state courts to respect federal
judgments, because the judicial power over cases and controversies
implies the power to render a judgment that carries binding effect.
"To decide a case or controversy implies some binding effect,"
Degnan argued; "[a] judgment or decree that lacked finality would
constitute something other than an exercise of the judicial
power."216 He concluded that federal-state preclusion "will have to
be placed forthrightly on the ground that the integrity of the federal
judicial power is at stake."217 Professor Charles Alan Wright, draw
ing on Degnan's ideas, summarizes the argument this way:
Article ill limits the federal judicial power to cases and controversies.
To decide a case or controversy implies some binding effect. Proceed
ings that do not have at least the potential effect of precluding later
relitigation of the same claims and issues would constitute something
other than the exercise of the judicial power. Once it is accepted that
Article ill and its implementing legislation have created courts with
the power to issue judgments that will have preclusive effects in other
litigation, the Supremacy Clause of Article VI mandates that those
preclusive effects are binding on state courts.218

Professors Degnan and Wright see the obligation of state courts to
respect federal judgments as having its roots in the federal laws that
give judicial power to the federal courts. The argument has at
tracted adherents,219 and it finds support in at least one Supreme
Court opinion. Even before the string of Supreme Court opinions
relying inexplicably on the Full Faith and Credit Clause and stat
ute,220 the Court, albeit somewhat cryptically, adopted the theory
that Article m and the federal jurisdictional statutes imply an obli215. Degnan, supra note 1.
216. Id. at 768-69.
217. Id. at 772-73.
218. CHAru.Es ALAN Wrumrr, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 736-37 (5th ed. 1994) (citing
Degnan, supra note 1, at 742-49, 768-69).
,
219. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 cmt. a (1982) (suggesting that the
obligation derives from Article I and Article ill); Watkins v. Resorts Intl. Hotel & Casino,
591 A.2d 592, 597 (NJ. 1991) (relying in part on Article ill in finding an obligation to accord
preclusive effect to a federal judgment); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 104, § 4468, at 649 (ac
cepting Article III as a basis for state courts' obligation to respect federal judgments); see
also Burbank, supra note 1, at 753-55 & n.92 (acknowledging Article ill's relevance "in im
posing a basic obligation to respect federal judicial proceedings" but disagreeing with
Degnan's reliance on Article ill as a grant of power to federal courts to determine fully the
preclusive effects of their judgments).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 210-12.
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gation on state courts to give preclusive effect to federal judgments.
In Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 221 the Court held that a state court's
failure to give effect to a federal court judgment constituted a fed
eral question and thus triggered the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court:
Where a State court refuses to give effect to the judgment of a court
of the United States rendered upon the point in dispute, and with
jurisdiction of the case and the parties, a question is undoubtedly
raised which . . . may be brought to this court for revision. The case
would be one in which a title or right is claimed under an authority
exercised under the United States, and the decision is against the title
or right so set up. It would thus be a case arising under the laws of the
United States, establishing the Circuit Court and vesting it with juris
diction . . .222
.

The

Dupasseur

Court understood that the Full Faith and Credit

Clause did not apply to a federal-state configuration and pointed
out where it does apply: "The refusal by the courts of one State to
give effect to the decisions of the courts of another State is an in
fringement of a different article of the Constitution, to wit, the first
section of article four . . . . "223
Professor Degnan's Article III argument might be challenged
for failing to account for the preclusive effect of judgments ren
dered by non-Article III federal tribunals, such as U.S. Bankruptcy
Courts,224 military courts,225 and the U.S. Tax Court.226 But
221. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 131 (1875).
222. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 134.
223. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 134.
224. See Abdallah v. United Sav. Bank, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286, 290 (Ct. App. 1996) (giving
claim-preclusive effect to a bankruptcy court order), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 746 (1997);
Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1179 (D.C. 1986) (applying claim preclusion to bar
claims that could have been asserted in prior bankruptcy court proceeding and stating that
"[t]he ordinary principles of res judicata are applicable to bankruptcy decrees"); Hochstadt v.
Orange Broad., 588 So. 2d 51, 52-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (applying federal law to deter
mine the issue-preclusive effect of a bankruptcy court determination that a debt had been
fully paid).

225. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 133 A.2d 207, 218 (Pa. 1957) (holding a military
court conviction admissible in state court criminal trial and stating, "[w]e have no authority
to inquire into or review the record of a court-martial; its judgment is conclusive on this and
other civil courts"); Commonwealth v. Smith, 563 A.2d 905, 910-11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(upholding the use of a court-martial conviction for sentence enhancement but noting that
several state courts disagree), affd., 598 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1991).
226. See United States v. Bizanes (In re Estate of Bizanes), 109 N.W.2d 823, 825-26
(Mich. 1961) (holding a state probate court bound by U.S. Tax Court determination of tax
deficiencies and explicitly rejecting the argument that res judicata does not apply because the
tax court "is not a court, but an independent agency in the executive branch of the govern
ment"); Tarutis v. Commissioner of Revenue, 393 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Minn. 1986) (allowing a
state court assertion of issue preclusion based on a U.S. Tax Court determination of the
deductibility of farm losses); Kostelanetz, Ritholz, Tigue & Fmk v. Himmelwright, 603 A.2d
168, 169-70 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (giving issue-preclusive effect, in a state court
legal malpractice counterclaim, to a U.S. Tax Court determination of the unreliability of tax-
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Degnan's logic extends to all tribunals established or empowered
by federal law. Any federal law establishing tribunals and authoriz
ing them to adjudicate implies some binding effect and thus obli
gates states to respect such adjudications.221
Federal law establishing and empowering tribunals gives those
tribunals' judgments some binding effect. Federal law of claim pre
clusion and issue preclusion, as a matter of federal common law,228
governs the scope of that binding effect. Further, this bundle of
federal law, governing the effect of federal judgments, binds the
state courts under the Supremacy Clause.229
B.

Choice of Preclusion Law

Finding an interjurisdictional obligation to respect judgments
does not end the inquiry. To know the source of an obligation is
not the same as knowing the content of that obligation. Whose law
of claim preclusion and issue preclusion governs the interjurisdic
tional effect of a judgment?
In interjurisdictional preclusion cases, courts could plausibly
consider applying the preclusion law of:
payer's income tax returns), affd., 625 A.2d 488 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Hanson v.
Oregon Dept. of Revenue, 653 P.2d 964, 967-69 (Or. 1982) (upholding a state tax court's
application of issue preclusion based on a U.S. Tax Court judgment); cf. Estate of Ravetti v.
United States, 37 F.3d 1393, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a state court need not
give preclusive effect to a U.S. Tax Court judgment if a state court litigant was not a party to
the tax court's "innocent spouse" adjudication); M.A. Crowley Trucking, Inc. v. Moyers, 665
A.2d 1077, 1080 (N.H. 1995) (denying collateral estoppel effect of a U.S. Tax Court judgment
because the issue was not actually litigated).
227. Analogously, the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review certain state court
judgments implies that the state courts are bound by the Supreme Court's determinations in
those cases. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (1993) (granting the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review certain judgments rendered
by "the highest court of a state").
228. See Lilly, supra note 18, at 316 & n.100; cf. Burbank, supra note 1, at 753-78 (analyz
ing the federal common law obligation to respect federal judgments but contending that state
preclusion rules may sometimes provide the content of that obligation).
229. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
Professor Burbank would break this Supremacy Clause analysis into two steps - source
of obligation and source of rules: "A federal common law obligation to respect [federal
court] judgments is binding under the supremacy clause. Moreover, to the extent that they
provide the measure of that federal obligation, the rules adopted to govern the preclusive
effects of federal judgments, whether furnished by federal or state law are also binding under
the supremacy clause." Burbank, supra note 1, at 763; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Federal
Judgments Law: Sources ofAuthority and Sources ofRules, 70 TEXAS L. REv. 1551, 1565-71
{1992). I contend that federal preclusion rules do furnish the measure of the federal obliga
tion to respect federal judgments, an obligation made binding on the states through the
Supremacy Clause.
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(1) F1;
(2) F2;
(3) the source of substantive law at

F1;

(4) the source of substantive law at F2;

(5)

the state in which F1 sits, if F1 was a federal court sitting in diver
sity; and

(6)

the state in which F2 sits, if F2 is a federal court sitting in diversity.

These options naturally divide into two sets: those that refer to F1
and thus render choice of preclusion law determinable at the time
of the initial action (the odd-numbered options), and those that re
fer to F2 and thus make choice of preclusion law determinable only
at the time of the subsequent action (the even-numbered options).
As between these two sets of options, the essential question, dis
cussed below in section ID.B.1, is this: Is F2 relevant at all, or
should choice of preclusion law be determinable at F1? If, as I ar
gue, the answer is that F2 is irrelevant and choice of preclusion law
should follow purely an F1 referent, then the next question, dis
cussed below in section ID.B.2, is whether a pure F1 referent re
quires application of F1's preclusion law.

1. A Pure F1 Referent
Should choice of preclusion law be determinable by looking
solely at the initial lawsuit? The full faith and credit statute seems
to say so. It requires all state, territorial, and federal courts to give
state and territorial court judicial proceedings "the same full faith
and credit" that those proceedings "have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are
taken. "230 Justice Story declared as early as 1813 that the full faith
and credit statute required a federal court to apply New York pre
clusion law to determine the effect of a New York judgment.231 As
Professor Stephen Burbank has shown, the statute does not point
directly to F1's preclusion law but rather indicates an F1 referent that is, application of whatever preclusion law the rendering juris
diction itself would use to determine the judgment's effect.232 F2's
irrelevance, however, has by no means been universally accepted.
230. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). The full faith and credit statute specifically refers to "judi
proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession [of the United
States]." 28 U.S.C. § 1738. This article often refers to configurations of state and federal
courts. State courts, as used in this context, should be understood to include U.S. territorial
courts as well.
231. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813) (Story, J.).
232. See Burbank, supra note 1, at 797-800.
cial
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have been advanced against a pure F 1 referent in state-state and
state-federal preclusion cases, notwithstanding the language of the
full faith and credit statute. The same arguments have been as
serted against a pure F 1 referent in federal-state preclusion cases,
where they carry more force because of the full faith and credit
statute's inapplicability. Some of the arguments focus on F2 qua
forum, urging that F2 has interests at stake and should be empow
ered to apply its own preclusion law, at least to some extent. Other .
arguments focus on the interests of the source of law at F2 or, in
federal court diversity cases, on the state in which F2 sits.
The two most important arguments against a pure F 1 referent what I call the "greater preclusion" argument and the "core preclu
sion" argument - both concern the policy interests of F2 as the
forum. The forum of the second lawsuit has genuine interests at
stake in claim preclusion and issue preclusion decisions. The sec
ond forum, by applying claim preclusion, preserves its judicial re
sources by refusing to adjudicate a claim that has already been
decided.233 Similarly, by applying issue preclusion, the second fo
rum preserves resources by taking certain already litigated issues as
conclusively determined. The finality-based interests of claim and
issue preclusion other than efficiency, such as repose for litigants
and respect for the judicial system, belong more to F 1 than F2• But
F2's interest in its preclusion rules transcends judicial economy. In
asmuch as preclusion rules limit the availability of adjudication at
2
F2, they raise concerns about justice and access. 34

i.

Greater Preclusion.

Based on these forum interests, some

commentators have argued that F2 is permitted to give a judgment
2
preclusive effect than F 1 would give. 35 The full faith and

greater

233. Courts thus sometimes address the public interest in finality in terms of the particu
lar docket-control concerns of F2• Chief Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit, for example,
justified res judicata on grounds of "the interest of society and the courts in the final resolu
tion of disputes. The explosion of federal dockets in recent years is so notorious as to require
no comment. Judicial resources today are an increasingly scarce commodity, and it is of the
utmost importance that litigants use them wisely." Schmieder v. Hall, 545 F.2d 768, 771 {2d
Cir. 1976). Cf. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65 (1878) ("[l]nterest rei public<e,
ut sit finis litium",· it concerns the public that there be an end of litigation.).
234. These concerns primarily involve situations where F2 would give less preclusive ef
fect than F1• Therefore, while they may support the core preclusion argument, they do not
support the greater preclusion argument.
235. See David P. Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 317,
326-27 {1978); Eugene F. Scoles, Interstate Preclusion by Prior Litigation, 74 Nw. U. L. RE.v.
742, 749-53 (1979); Gene R Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice ofLaw, 64 TEXAS L. RE.v.
1209, 1228-29, 1265 {1986); Allan D. Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata, 62
MICH. L. RE.v. 33, 41, 52 (1963); Gregory S. Getschow, Comment, If at First You Do Succeed:
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credit statute's insistence that courts give "the same full faith and
credit" that the rendering court would give, according to this argu
ment, means only that courts may not give

less

preclusive effect

than the rendering court would give.
Courts occasionally act in explicit or tacit agreement with this
argument. For example, in Finley v. Kesling,236 an Illinois court
gave nonmutual issue-preclusive effect to a prior Indiana judgment
despite Indiana's adherence to the mutuality requirement.237 Thus,
the Illinois court gave the judgment greater preclusive effect than
the rendering forum would have given. The Illinois court adopted
the greater preclusive effect argument - that F2 does not violate
full faith and credit as long as it gives at least as much preclusive

effect as F1 would give.238
The Mortgagelinq case239 provides another example. There, the
New Jersey state courts dismissed claims pursuant to the entire con
troversy doctrine,240 even though the rendering forum - the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania would not have held the claims precluded.241 Again, the greater
preclusive effect argument supports New Jersey's application of its
own preclusion doctrine, because the New Jersey courts gave more,
not less, binding effect to the judgment.
The greater preclusion argument should be rejected, however,
as it wrongly assumes that greater preclusion is none of F1's conRecognition ofState Preclusive Laws in Subsequent Multistate Actions, 35 V1u L. REv. 253,
265, 276-80 {1990); see also 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 104, § 4467, at 644-48 {discussing
but only partly endorsing the greater preclusion argument). The Supreme Court has used
language supportive of this argument. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 {1963) ("Full
faith and credit thus generally requires every State to give to a judgment at least the res
judicata effect which the judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered it.").
More recently, however, the Supreme Court seems to have rejected the greater preclusion
argument. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060, 4067-68 (U.S. Jan. 13,
1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 85
(1984).
236. 433 N.E.2d 1112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
237. See 433 N.E.2d at 1114. The Illinois court questioned whether Indiana would con
tinue to cling to the mutuality requirement but considered itself free to give nonmutual
preclusive effect even if Indiana adhered to mutuality. See 433 N.E.2d at 1116-17.
238. See 433 N.E.2d at 1116-17 (explaining that the second state cannot reduce the effect
of the judgment, but can expand its effect); see also In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litig.,
455 F. Supp. 999, 1005-06 (N.D. Ill. 1978) ("[E]ven if Delaware courts would not permit the
offensive use of collateral estoppel, this court would give the Delaware judgment greater
preclusive effect than Delaware courts.").
239. Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 536 (N.J. 1995).
240. The entire controversy doctrine includes New Jersey's rule of mandatory party join
der enforced through claim preclusion. On the entire controversy doctrine and Mortgage
linq, see supra text accompanying notes 181-88.
241. See Mortgagelinq, 662 A.2d at 537, 540-41.
..
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cem. The argument ignores the impact of preclusfon law on litiga
tion behavior at F1• In Finley, the Illinois court (F2) failed to
appreciate that participants in the Indiana lawsuit (F1) based their
conduct on the understanding that the judgment could not later be
invoked by nonparties. Indiana legitimately may expect and desire
its litigants to conduct themselves on that understanding. For ex
ample, Indiana may prefer to avoid the aggressive litigation con
duct, delay tactics, and expansive joinder that nonmutual preclusion
can engender.242 In Mortgagelinq, the New Jersey court (F2) appar
ently was untroubled by the possibility that the plaintiffs in the
Pennsylvania federal court lawsuit (F1) made joinder decisions
based on the federal courts' legitimate choice not to mandate join
der of all possible defendants.243
Some commentators have suggested that cases involving the
interjurisdictional application of statutes of limitations support the
greater preclusion argument, but only when F2 merely closes its
own doors to the claim and does not purport to extinguish any sub
stantive rights.244 If a state dismisses an action under its statute of
limitations, a second state generally may apply its own longer stat
ute of limitations and allow the claim.245 In other words, some
shorter statutes of limitations are treated as "door-closing rules"
that bar the assertion of claims in a particular state but have no
effect elsewhere.246 If states are allowed to bar claims based on
their own idiosyncratic statutes of limitations, the argument goes,

242. Professor Graham Lilly makes this point persuasively by emphasizing the uncer
tainty for litigants if F2 may apply its own greater preclusion rule: "Since it is uncertain
where the next suit will be filed, the parties will have an incentive to conduct the first suit as
if the stakes are high. In this context, the public and private resources invested in the initial
suit are apt to be disproportionately large . . . . Familiar pretrial skirmishing such as motion
practice, discovery, and jury selection will expand to reflect the added risk of future litiga
tion." Lilly, supra note 18, at 312-13.
243. See Burbank, supra note 18,

at

100-01.

244. See Perry Dane, Sovereign Dignity and Glorious Chaos: A Comment on the In
terjurisdictional Implications of the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS LJ. 173, 18586, 188 (1996); Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 159-60, 168. Professor Dane uses
the statute of limitations analogy to suggest that New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine,
although generally perceived as a rule of preclusion, should be treated as a mere procedural
door closer that can be applied by New Jersey courts as F2 to dismiss claims based on prior
litigation elsewhere. See Dane, supra, at 185-86, 188.

245. See Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 145-46, 159-60 & n.176, 168 & n.219.
Moreover, a state may invoke its own statute of limitations to refuse enforcement of another
state's judgment, even if the state that rendered the judgment would not time-bar the en
forcement See Dane, supra note 244, at 186 n.40.
246. In this regard, they are analogous to dismissals on grounds of forum non conveniens
or for lack of personal jurisdiction.
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they should be allowed to invoke their own idiosyncratic preclusion
rules to disallow relitigation of claims in their own courts.247
The statute of limitations analogy is unpersuasive. Courts ap
plying preclusion rules virtually never purport to be applying mere
"door-closers."248 Moreover, statutes of limitations do not create
the pervasive strategic incentives engendered by preclusion law, in
particular by those preclusion rules on which U.S. jurisdictions di
verge.249 H F2 applies its own preclusion law rather than F1's, it
undermines the litigation-related polici�s of F1 and betrays the le
gitimate expectations of the participants at F1 on which they may
have based significant litigation decisions.25o

ii.

Core Preclusion.

In addition to the "greater preclusion"

argument, there is the "core preclusion" argument. Some commen
tators contend that F2 only need respect the "core" preclusion val
ues of F1 and may apply its own preclusion law as to matters outside
that core.251 The argument, in essence, is that full faith and credit
or other interjurisdictional preclusion obligations should apply only
247. Professors Dreyfuss and Silberman advance the statute of limitations analogy to
show that New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine can be considered a "housekeeping" doc
trine designed primarily to prevent relitigation within the New Jersey courts and that it there
fore may be permissible for New Jersey to apply the doctrine based on its interest as F2• See
Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 159-60, 168. They conclude, however, that the
doctrine should apply only when both F1 and F2 are New Jersey state courts, because only in
that situation are New Jersey's resources burdened twice. See id. at 170-71; see also Dane,
supra note 244, at 185-86 & n.40 (articulating a version of this argument to suggest that New
Jersey courts may apply the entire controversy doctrine to bar claims based on prior litigation
elsewhere).
The "door-closing" argument for allowing F2 to apply its own greater preclusion rules
depends in part on characterizing those preclusion rules as "procedural" rather than "sub
stantive." In this regard, it is interesting to note Professor D. Michael Risinger's argument
that the core res judicata rule prohibiting double recovery is substantive, but most of the
rules of issue preclusion and claim preclusion are procedural. See D. Michael Risinger, "Sub
stance" and "Procedure" Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of
"Irrebuttable Presumptions," 30 UCLA L. REv. 189, 210-11 (1982). Note, however, that for
interjurisdictional preclusion problems, it will not suffice to label preclusion rules "proce
dural"; we still must determine whether we are talking about F1 's procedural concerns or F2's.
The main point of this article is that even if preclusion rules can be characterized as largely
"procedural," the most important procedural concerns implicated are those of F1•
248. The only contrary example of which I am aware is Mortgagelinq, in which the New
Jersey Supreme Court barred the plaintiff's claim under the entire controversy doctrine but
asserted that its dismissal should not preclude the plaintiff from asserting the same claim
elsewhere. See Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Co=onwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 536, 54142 (NJ. 1995).
249. See supra Part I (discussing strategic incentives); supra section 11.B. (discussing pre
clusion law divergences).
250. Although F2 mitigates the problem inasmuch as its dismissal does not extinguish
substantive rights, it still betrays the policies of F1 if litigants at F1 made decisions based on an
expectation of access to a particular state's courts.
251. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 104, § 4467, at 625.
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to the extent necessary to protect the rendering forum's interest in
its own judgment. While a rendering jurisdiction has an interest in
safeguarding the validity of its judgments, the argument goes, it has
much less of an interest in such details as whether its judgments are
given nonmutual issue-preclusive effect.252 This "core preclusion"
argument is advanced in the leading treatise on federal procedure:
The central core of [res judicata] rules must of course be followed to
support the finality, repose, and reliance values that are common to
res judicata policy in all states. Many other rules should be followed
to support the first court's power to control its own procedures.
Nonetheless, it is not desirable to suppose that every last variation of
preclusion policy is so far part of the judgment that full faith and
credit commands obedience. To the contrary, there are many situa
tions in which the res judicata effects of a state court judgment are
properly controlled by the domestic rules of a second state. The key
to understanding the scope of full faith and credit lies not in a mono
lithic view that all res judicata rules are indistinguishable but in a
careful appraisal of the purposes that underlie different rules.253

The argument has been attributed to Professor Edward Cooper.254
Professor Cooper's application of the core preclusion view to mutu
ality is instructive. If F1 requires mutuality, he argues, F2 should not

allow nonmutual preclusion even if F2 has abandoned the mutuality
requirement. On the other hand, if F1 would allow nonmutual pre
clusion, then F2 need not follow F1's preclusion law and can apply
its

own mutuality

requirement

to

disallow issue

preclusion.

According to Professor Cooper, F2 should respect F1's mutuality
rule because
[a]ssertion of nonmutual preclusion in such circumstances would
make it impossible for the first court to give effect to policies that may
include broad freedom in selecting parties, freedom to litigate a par
ticular case according to its own needs without concern about the im
pact on other cases, and acceptance of results that seem just between
particular parties even though a new trial or directed verdict would be
required if the stakes were greater.255

But Professor Cooper does not see the same concerns in the reverse
situation and would allow F2 to disregard F1's nonmutual preclusion
rule:
252. See id. § 4467, at 642-43 ("[A] court that prefers to deny nonmutual preclusion
should not be required to follow the rules of another court. Nonmutual preclusion is simply
not so central a component of res judicata as to be swept into full faith and credit." (footnote
omitted)).
253. Id. § 4467, at 625.
254. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 95.
255. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 104, § 4466, at 617.
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The major values served by nonmutual preclusion lie in the public
costs of relitigation and the fear of inconsistency. A later court
should be free to assume the costs of relitigation. And a first court
should not be able to inflict on others its timorous fears of being
proved wrong.256

Compare Cooper's view with the greater preclusion argument,
which leads to exactly the opposite conclusion. The greater preclu
sion argument would allow F2 to disregard F1's mutuality require
ment - that is, to give greater issue-preclusive effect to the
judgment than F1 would give - but would not allow F2 to disregard
F1's rule allowing nonmutual preclusion.257
Professor Cooper's core preclusion argument has drawn criti
cism for ignoring the full faith and credit "policy of unifying and
integrating the several states"258 and for violating the litigation poli
cies inherent in F1's preclusion rules.259 My earlier discussion of
preclusion law divergences and litigation incentives underscores
that criticism by showing that the points of preclusion law on which
jurisdictions vary create powerful litigation incentives at F1• The
core preclusion argument fails to give enough respect to F1's inter
est in the litigation policies fostered by its preclusion rules. Profes
sor Cooper correctly demonstrates that F1's litigation policies are
implicated by F2's disregard of F1's mutuality rule. But he does not
recognize that F1's litigation policies are equally implicated by F2's
disregard of F1's nonmutuality rule. A rule allowing nonmutual
preclusion seriously affects litigation incentives in the first forum.
Among other things, it makes parties more likely to settle, more
likely to join additional parties to achieve a complete resolution of
the controversy, and more likely to litigate zealously.260 While F1
need not foster these incentives, F1's choice to foster them should
not be disregarded by other jurisdictions.
m.
The F2 Law Supplier. In addition to arguments concern
ing F2's interests as forum, some have argued that preclusion law
should give way based on the interests of the source of substantive
law in the subsequent lawsuit.261 This argument has arisen espe-

256. Id.; see also id. § 4467, at 647-48.
257. See Getschow, supra note 235, at 277-79 (arguing that issue preclusion - especially
greater effect - is merely a matter of F2's policy choices and that full faith and credit there
fore does not apply).
258. Burbank, supra note 18, at 96.
259. See id. at 97.
260. See supra Part I.
261. See, e.g., Marjorie A. Silver, In Lieu ofPreclusion: Reconciling Administrative Deci
sionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 lNo. LJ. 368 (1990); Donald W. Nierling,

February 1998]

Interjurisdictional Preclusion

997

cially in cases where F2 is a federal court hearing a federal question
claim. Giving preclusive effect to a prior state court judgment
raises concerns about divesting the federal courts of power to ad
dress civil rights violations and other federal matters.
The Supreme Court has rejected this argument against preclu
sion, leaving open only the narrowest possibility of such substantive
law exceptions to full faith and credit. In Allen v. McCurry,262 for
example, a state court in a criminal trial had ruled against a criminal
defendant on certain Fourth Amendment search and seizure is
sues.263 The criminal defendant subsequently brought a civil sec
tion 1983 claim in federal court based on the same alleged Fourth
Amendment violations.264 The Supreme Court ruled that issue pre
clusion could be used against the criminal defendant turned plain
tiff, thus preventing relitigation of the Fourth Amendment issues.265
Federal law would displace the full faith and credit obligation, the
Court held, only if Congress specifically intended to create an ex
ception to full faith and credit by legislating a partial repeal of the
full faith and credit statute.266 1bis has proved to be a narrow loop
hole indeed; the Supreme Court has yet to find a federal statute
that displaces full faith and credit under this "partial repeal" analy
sis.267 To the extent that a federal statute can effect a partial repeal
of section 1738, that establishes a narrow exception to a pure F1
referent in state-federal preclusion cases.26s
Note, The Role of Preclusion
lowA L. REv. 1473 (1986).

Rules in Title VII: An Analysis of Congressional Intent, 71

262. 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
263.

See 449 U.S. at 92.
See 449 U.S. at 92.
265. See 449 U.S. at 103-05.
266. See 449 U.S. at 97-99; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873,

264.

881 (1996); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 381 (1985);
Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468-72 (1982); REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt. e (1982) (recognizing the possibility of a legislative policy exception);
Andrea Catania, Access to the Federal Courts for Title VII Claimants in the Post-Kremer Era:
Keeping the Doors Open, 16 LoYoLA U. CHI. LJ. 209, 224-25 (1985).
267. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CrvlL PROCEDURE § 14.12, at 681 (2d ed. 1993)
("[T]he Supreme Court has yet to identify any federal statute as embracing an exclusivity
principle that would prevent the normal operation of collateral estoppel."). Actually, the
federal habeas corpus statute can be viewed as an exception to full faith and credit. See 28
U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West Supp. 1997) (permitting federal court habeas corpus relief from
state court adjudications that are "contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as deter
mined by the Supreme Court" or that are "based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding"); see also Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
268. The federal constitutional requirement of minimal due process provides another as
pect of federal law that limits the application of either intra- or interjurisdictional preclusion
doctrine. For example, except in narrowly defined situations, the due process requirement
does not allow a nonparty to be bound by a judgment. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 116
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Finally, some courts have taken the posi

tion that where F2 is a federal court hearing state law claims, that
court should apply the preclusion law of the state in which it sits.
For example, in

Itzkoff v. F&G Realty of New Jersey, Corp.,269

F1

was a New York state court, and F2 was the federal court for the
District of New Jersey, sitting in diversity. The federal court ap
plied New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine to determine the
preclusive effect of the New York judgment because it treated the
situation as an Erie problem and looked to the law of the state in
which it sits.270 The court's Erie concerns, however, were mis
placed. As Professor Degnan ably demonstrated, even where F2 is
a federal court sitting in diversity, F2's preclusion decision should be
1
guided not by Erie but rather by the full faith and credit statute.21
Some courts have wandered even further astray and have con
ducted Erie analyses to conclude that F2's preclusion law should ap
ply when F2 is a state court and F1 was a federal court sitting in
diversity. For example, in

Bank, 272

Douglas v. First Security Federal Savings

a Maryland state court grappled with the claim-preclusive

effect of a judgment of the federal court for the Eastern District of
Vrrginia.

The claim-preclusive effect of the prior judgment de

pended on whether Douglas was in privity with a party to the prior
federal suit. The Maryland court, relying on the

Erie

doctrine,

chose to apply its own Maryland preclusion law to determine priv
ity.273

Douglas's Erie analysis is even more misplaced than
Itzkoffs, because in Douglas the only state in which a relevant fed
eral court sat was Virginia. Thus, if any Erie analysis were appro
priate, it would have been to protect uniformity between the
Virginia state and federal courts. Maryland has nothing to do with
it.
S. Ct. 1761, 1765 n.4 (1996); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-46 (1940). Also, no full faith
and credit is due a judgment rendered by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction, see
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729-31 (1877), or a decree that exceeds the authority of the
issuing court, see Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060, 4065 (U.S. Jan. 13,
1998).

269. 890 F. Supp. 351 (D.NJ. 1995).
270. See 890 F. Supp. at 355-59.
271. See Degnan, supra note 1, at 750-55. Because the full faith and credit statute man
dates an F1 referent, no F2 Erie analysis is warranted. But even if the court conducts an Erie
inquiry at F2, the appropriate inquiry, under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), would ask whose preclusion law the F2 state courts would apply.
See 313 U.S. at 496. As argued in this article, the answer to that question should point to F1's
preclusion law.
272. 643 A.2d 920 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
273. See 643 A.2d at 924-25.
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b. Arguments in Favor of a Pure F1 Referent. Neither the
greater preclusion argument, the core preclusion argument, the law
supplier argument, nor Erie provides a sound reason to abandon a
pure F1 referent. At least for the state-state and state-federal con
figurations, statutory language demands a pure F1 referent. The full
faith and credit statute does not say that courts must give "at least
as much faith and credit" to judgments as the rendering jurisdiction
would give. Nor does the statute say that courts must give "a cen
tral core of faith and credit" to judgments. It most assuredly does
not say that a court must give full faith and credit except when it is
applying its own substantive law, or except when it is a federal court
hearing a state law claim. Rather, the statute says that courts must
give "the

same full faith and

credit" that the rendering jurisdiction

would give.274 Despite the statute's clarity on this point, we should
venture beyond "the statute says so." Not only is a deeper resolu
tion more satisfying, but in the federal-state configuration, in which
it is doubtful that the full faith and credit statute applies,275 a reso
lution based on more than statutory language is essential.
As a matter of litigation policy, the applicable preclusion rules
must be determinable at F1 and must not depend on where the sub
sequent case is filed. At Fi, practitioners and their clients make
critical decisions concerning joinder of claims, joinder of parties, re
source allocation, appeal, delay, settlement, criminal pleas, consoli
dation, class certification, jury trial, and other matters. Preclusion
law affects these decisions.276 At the same time, nonparties make
critical decisions concerning intervention, involvement, and testi
mony. Preclusion law affects these decisions as well.277 These ac
tors cannot wait until a subsequent action is filed before they know
whose preclusion rules will apply.
Moreover, in all of these litigation decisions, F1's policies are at
stake. As discussed in Part I, each jurisdiction makes "genuine
value choices"278 in selecting among preclusion law possibilities.
For example, a broad definition of "same claim" induces joinder of
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) (emphasis added). I may be criticized for emphasizing
the word "same," because that word arrived in 1948 with legislative history calling it a change
"in phraseology." See Burbank, supra note 18, at 99-100 & n.63. But even the statute's
original 1790 language indicates a pure F1 referent: "judicial proceedings . . . shall have such
full faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law
or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken." Act of
May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat 122.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 208-12.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 19-54.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
278. Resnik, supra note 20, at 981-82.
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related claims, yielding fewer separate lawsuits but rendering each
lawsuit more complex. A jurisdiction may choose to encourage
joinder in order to reduce the number of independent lawsuits and
to make each adjudication as complete as possible. Alternatively, a
jurisdiction may choose not to encourage such joinder, in order to
avoid unnecessarily complex multiclaim lawsuits and to avoid pres
suring litigants into asserting claims they might otherwise forgo.
Each jurisdiction's law of claim preclusion and issue preclusion re
flects a balancing - albeit not necessarily a skillful balancing - of
competing interests.

These competing interests include judicial

economy, completeness of adjudicative resolution, zealousness of
advocacy, litigant autonomy, and public reliance on the finality of
adjudication.219
This is not to say that the second forum lacks any legitimate
interest. F2's application of claim and issue preclusion advances F2's
interest in judicial economy and reflects a balancing between truth
seeking and efficiency. While there is no denying the judicial econ
omy power of a dismissal based on claim preclusion, it is hard to
sympathize with F2's judicial economy concerns in the context of
interjurisdictional preclusion, where by definition F2 has not ex
pended any judicial resources in the first lawsuit.280 Nor can, one
deny F2's interest in the integrity of its own adjudications, especially
where F2 would allow the assertion of claims or the relitigation of
issues by giving less preclusive effect than would F1•
But for purposes of articulating a sound rule for choice of pre
clusion law, F2's interests pale in comparison to those of F1• This is
not because F2's interests are small, but because they come into
play so infrequently. F2's interests come into play only in cases in
which a party actually asserts claim preclusion or issue preclusion at
F2• Preclusion-sensitive decisions at Fi. by contrast, come into play
whenever there is a possibility of a future assertion of claim preclu
sion or issue preclusion. Whenever that possibility exists, as it does
in an enormous range of lawsuits,281 it may affect the litigation be
havior of participants at F1• Litigators handling F1 lawsuits with a
possibility of related litigation elsewhere will make strategic deci
sions based on the preclusion law that they expect will be applied.
If litigators in a mutuality jurisdiction expect the mutuality rule to
govern, then they will make joinder and settlement decisions on
that basis. If they expect that other jurisdictions will ignore F1's
279. See supra text accompanying notes 62-71.
280. See Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 168.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 2-14.
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mutuality rule and allow nonmutual preclusion based on F2's own

preclusion law, then they may decide differently. Likewise, if liti
gators in federal court in Kansas expect federal preclusion law to

govern the effect of the judgment even if a subsequent action is
brought in Kansas state court, they will make strategic decisions on
that basis; if they expect Kansas's one-action rule to apply, they will
make very different decisions, such as joining additional parties.
Thus, F2's interests arise with only a fraction of the frequency with
which F1's interests arise. By the sheer number and significance of
litigation decisions affected by preclusion law,282 and the breadth of
cases in which such considerations arise,283 F1's concerns should
dominate. In sum, F2's undeniable interests cannot overcome the
litigation participants' need to determine the applicable preclusion
rules at the time of the initial action and F1's interest in controlling
litigation behavior in its courts.

2. Probing the F1 Referent
Thus far, I have argued that F2 generally should be disregarded
for purposes of determining applicable preclusion law and that the
governing preclusion law should be determinable at F1• In other
words, I have argued in favor of a pure F1 referent. But a pure F1
referent does not necessarily require the application of F1's own
preclusion law. Using our F1 referent, whose preclusion law should
apply?

a. The F1 Law Supplier.

Even with F2 out of the picture, F1 is

not the only sovereign with genuine interests at stake. In addition
to F1 and F2, the jurisdiction that supplied the substantive law at Fi.

if the applicable law was neither F1's nor F2's, may claim an interest.
If substantive rights determined at F1 are jeopardized by the preclu
sion law applied at F2, that may impinge on the interests of the law
supplying jurisdiction.284 On this reasoning, some courts apply the
preclusion law of the F1 law supplier.285
282. See supra text accompanying notes 19-71.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 2-14.
284. See Burbank, supra note 1, at 808-09; Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra note 161, at 13952.
285. See Follette v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F.3d 1234, 1237 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying
Louisiana's statutory claim-preclusion exception to determine the effect in an Arkansas fed
eral court of a prior Louisiana federal court diversity judgment and explaining that "[w]hen a
federal court is sitting in diversity, the preclusive effect of a prior judgment is determined by
the preclusion rules of the forum which provided the substantive law underlying that prior
judgment"); Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. carco Rentals, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1143, 1157
(W.D. Ark. 1996) (applying Oklahoma preclusion law to determine the effect of an
Oklahoma federal court diversity judgment, upon an explicit finding that the prior court ap
plied Oklahoma rather than Arkansas substantive law). Although the Follette and Philadel-
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For example, suppose a dispute involving a New York contract
and governed by New York law is litigated in New Jersey state
court. The court finds that New York contract law does not provide
a remedy on the facts pleaded and dismisses for failure to state a
claim but does not state whether the dismissal is with prejudice.
Subsequently, the plaintiff refiles in Connecticut state court, and
the defendant asserts that the action is claim precluded. Under
New Jersey (F1) preclusion law, the dismissal is "on the merits" and
therefore claim preclusive; under Connecticut (F2) preclusion law,
the dismissal is not "on the merits" and therefore not claim preclu·
sive.286 But what about New York? Doesn't New York - the F1
law supplier - have an interest in the :finality of adjudications con·
ceming New York contracts, and therefore shouldn't the Connecti·
cut court consider New York preclusion law?
The law supplier's interest should not govern choice of preclu·
sion law for at least two reasons. First, the substantive law interests
of the law-supplying jurisdiction, just like F2's judicial economy and
fairness interests,287 are at stake only in the lawsuit in which claim
or issue preclusion is asserted. F1 's litigation-behavior interests, by
contrast, are at stake in every F1 litigation that might involve subse
quent related suits in other jurisdictions. For each case in which the
F1 law supplier's interest matters, there may be dozens in which F1
litigators behave differently based on anticipated choice of preclu
sion law.
Second, the law supplier's interest in the preclusion outcome
bears no relationship to its adoption of particular preclusion rules.
In our hypothetical contract dispute, the outcome may matter to
New York because it involves rights under New York contract law.
New York therefore has an interest in whether the New Jersey dis
missal is given preclusive effect in Connecticut. But New York's
interest in the dispute has nothing to do with New York's preclusion
rule that dismissals for failure to state a claim are not on the mer
its.288 New York's preclusion rule derives from New York's rela
tively technical pleading requirements.289 If New York pleading
phia Indemnity decisions could be understood

as Erie applications, see infra text
accompanying note 301, the opinions speak about the provider of the substantive law at Fi.
not about the state in which the federal F1 sat.

286.

See supra text accompanying notes 142-57.
See supra text accompanying notes 280·81.
288. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
289. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3013 (McKinney 1991). As one observer put it, "New York's ties

287.

to the Field Code remain strong and its flirtation with notice pleading has not yet ripened
into commitment." Oakley & Coon, supra note 162, at 1411; see also id. at 1411 n.280 (citing
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rules render complaints more likely to be dismissed for technical
defects than for substantive shortcomings, then it makes sense for
New York to deem such dismissals nonpreclusive unless the judge
specifies otherwise.290 There is no reason for New York's preclu
sion rule, derived from pleading and practice in New York courts,
to govern preclusion in a dispute involving only New Jersey and
Connecticut courts.
This analysis suggests a possible exception. When a preclusion
rule is clearly linked to a substantive right of action, then perhaps
that rule should accompany the right of action, regardless of the
litigation's locus.291 It is an exception in search of an application,
however, as nearly all preclusion rules are transsubstantive.292 With
the possible exception of the Kansas one-action rule, which is an
interpretation of the Kansas comparative negligence statute,293
rules of claim and issue preclusion are not linked to, and do not
depend on, the substantive rights asserted.
Of course, the law supplier need not be a third sovereign. Very
often either F1 itself or F2 will supply the applicable law at F1•
When F1 is applying its own substantive law, that only adds to what

I contend are the already dominant interests of F1• But what if the
F1 law supplier is F2? In our hypothetical contract dispute, suppose
the second action were filed in New York state court. Should the
combined interests of New York as law supplier and New York as
second forum overcome the interests of New Jersey as initial
forum?
Note that to arrive at this configuration of interests, the F1 law
supplying jurisdiction need not be F2• The same configuration of
interests presents itself whenever the F1 law-supplying jurisdiction
and F2 share a preclusion rule that differs from that of F1• In our
original hypothetical, neither New York (law supplier) preclusion
law nor Connecticut (F2) preclusion law would treat the dismissal as

New York cases "demand[ing] specificity as to the particular elements of the cause of action
being pleaded"}.
290. See Potter v. Emerol Mfg. Co., 89 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 {App. Div. 1949} {"As the merits
are not considered on [a demurrer], a determination dismissing the complaint for insuffi
ciency on its face would not bar a second suit based on a sufficient complaint.").
291. See Dreyfuss & Silberman,
the label "embedded rights").

supra note

161, at 139-52 (discussing this theory under

292. Transsubstantive rules apply across all substantive areas of law, as. opposed to non
transsubstantive rules, which apply only to specifically defined areas of law or rights of action.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, are mostly transsubstantive. See
Lowenthal & Erichson, supra note 12, at 994 n.17.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 190-94; see also Dreyfuss & Silberman, supra
note 161, at 140 & n.90 (mentioning the one-action rule as a possible application of embed
ded rights theory).
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claim preclusive. Thus, the question is whether the combined inter
ests of the law supplier and F2 - whether or not the same jurisdic
tion - should trump the interests of F1• As explained above, the F1
law supplier's interest merits little concern, because with few excep
tions, the law supplier's interest in the outcome is entirely uncon
nected to its own preclusion rules.294 Allowing choice of preclusion
law to depend on F2 raises serious concerns about preclusion rules
that are not determinable at the time of the first action - that is, by
a pure F1 referent.295 With the rare exception of preclusion rules
linked explicitly to substantive rights, the law supplier's attenuated
interest in the preclusion rules applied to the dispute, whether or
not paired with the interest of F2, does not alter the soundness of
choosing F1's preclusion law.296

b. The Meaning of a Judgment.

Moreover, it makes sense that

the meaning of a judgment ought to be construed according to the
renderer's rules. When a court enters a judgment, that judgment
carries various meanings, including its stare decisis value and its
narrative value to those involved in the dispute and to the commu
nity at large.297 In general, though, with the exception of litigation
pursued purely for symbolic import, a judgment's primary meaning
is its binding effect. That meaning cannot be ascertained by looking
at the judgment alone. Rather, the meaning of a judgment depends
upon the rendering jurisdiction's rules for construing its meaning that is, the rendering jurisdiction's law of judgments.298 Just as the
meaning of legislation should be defined by the legislating sover
eign's rules of statutory construction, including any relevant statu294. See supra text accompanying notes 288-93.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 276-83.
296. For another analysis reaching the same conclusion, see Lilly, supra note 18, at 325-26
(arguing that all approaches to choice of law analysis point to F1's preclusion law). Biii see
Burbank, supra note 1 (arguing that federal interests sometimes should trump in the state
federal configuration if federal substantive rights are at stake).
297. See Owen M. FISs, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1085 (1984) ("[A judge's]
job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to
explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitu
tion and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them.");
Owen M. Piss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 755 (1982) ("[T]he judge
. . . gives meaning and expression to the values embodied in [a legal] text.").
298. Justice Ginsburg nicely captured this idea in her phrasing of a recent full faith and
credit decision in which she noted that preclusive effects "travel with the sister state judg
ment." Baker v. General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060, 4064 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1998). In tying
a judgment's meaning to its source, I do not mean to suggest that a judgment's meaning
depends on the subjective intent of the rendering judge. As Justice Kennedy emphasized in
his Baker concurrence, "The question . . . is not what a trial court intended in a particular
case but the preclusive effect its judgment has under the controlling legal principles of its own
State." Baker, 66 U.S.L.W. at 4068 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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tory definitions and applicable "Dictionary Act,"299 the meaning of
a judgment should be defined by the rendering jurisdiction's rules
of judgment construction, including the law of claim preclusion and
issue preclusion.300
c.

Erie. If the interjurisdictional preclusion problem arises in

the federal-state configuration and the federal court's subject mat
ter jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship, then choice of
preclusion law presents an Erie301 question. A number of commen
tators have written on this issue and reached differing conclu
sions.302 Federal courts, too, have split on the issue.303 Although
the

Erie analysis is essential for understanding one slice of federal
state interjurisdictional preclusion, it should be noted that Erie is
irrelevant to other interjurisdictional configurations, and also that
299. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994) (federal Dictionary Act); N.Y.C.L.S. GENL. CoNSTR.
LAW §§ 1-121 (McKinney 1951 & Supp. 1997-1998) (New York General Construction Law).
The federal Dictionary Act includes, among other things, provisions that "words importing
the plural include the singular," 1 U.S.C. § 1, that "[t]he word 'company' . . . shall be deemed
to embrace the words 'successors and assigns of such company
, 1 U.S.C. § 5, and the
controversial 1996 addition specifying that "the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife," 1 U.S.C. § 7.
•

.

.

"'

300. The problem of discerning "the meaning of a judgment" can be viewed as a subset of
the more general problem of interpreting texts. In this regard, it is worth considering the
hermeneutics work of French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur has described certain char
acteristics of written work that he collectively calls "distanciation." One aspect of distancia
tion is the separation of meaning from the author's intent "[W]riting renders the text
autonomous with respect to the intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer
coincides with what the author meant; henceforth, textual meaning and psychological mean
ing have different destinies." PAUL RicoEUR, The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,
in HERMENEUTICS & THE SoCIAL SCIENCES 139 (J. Thompson ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1981). Distanciation's counterpart, according to Ricoeur, is "appropriation
(Aneignung) of the text, its application (Anwendung) to the present situation of the reader."
Id. at 143.
For interjurisdictional preclusion, Ricoeur's distanciation thesis packs a certain amount of
explanatory power. F1 renders a judgment, which by the act of writing is rendered independ
ent of F1's intended meaning. When that judicial text is read in the context of a subsequent
proceeding in another jurisdiction, F2 treats the judgment as an autonomous text and "appro
priates" the judgment to its own situation, much as a reader of a novel understands the work
in light of the reader's circumstances. In fact, although I disagree with its normative implica
tions in this context, Ricoeur's model describes well the findings discussed in Part IV of this
article - that many state judges reflexively apply their own jurisdiction's preclusion law, with
little or no attention to the source of the judgment. See infra text accompanying notes 31637.
301. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
302. See Burbank, supra note l; at 747-62; Stephen B. Burbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclu
sion and Federal Common Law: Toward a General Approach, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 625, 63537 (1985); Degnan, supra note 1, at 753-73; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reflections on the Sub
stance of Finality, 10 CoRNELL L. REv. 642, 643-47 (1985); Lilly, supra note 18, at 322-27;
Shreve, supra note 235, at 1211 n.3.
303. Compare, e.g., Austin v. Super Valu Stores, 31 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying the
preclusion law of the state in which the first federal diversity court sat) with Apparel Art
Intl., Inc. v. Amertex Enters. Ltd., 48 F.3d 576 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying federal preclusion
law). See also 18 WruoIIT ET AL., supra note 104, § 4472.
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the Erie argument applies equally to intramural federal-federal pre
clusion. If the initial forum was a federal court adjudicating a state
law claim, then the subsequent forum faces the

Erie

question

whether that subsequent forum is a state court or another federal
court.

Erie analysis offers no fully satisfying answer to whether, if F1 is
a federal court sitting in diversity, F2 should apply the preclusion
law of the state in which F1 sits.304 The stronger argument is that,
even in the

Erie

context, F2 should apply F1's (federal) preclusion
Plumer,305 we must ask whether any fed

law. First, under Hanna v.

eral rule or statute governs.306 In some cases involving the claim
preclusive effect of nonjoinder of claims or parties, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 13(a), 18, 19, and

20

arguably apply, just as Rule

41(b) informs the "on the merits" determination. To that extent,
the federal rules would trump state preclusion law unless the rules
exceed the rulemaking authority granted by the Rules Enabling
Act.307 In most situations, however, no federal rule or statute di
rectly governs claim and issue preclusion; federal res judicata is
largely federal common law.
Second, the analysis proceeds to examine what the Supreme
Court has called "the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws. "308 On these points, the argument for state preclusion law
gains force. Inequitable administration of the laws - significantly
different outcomes based on whether a case is decided in state or
federal court - could follow from a decision that federal preclusion
law applies when F1 is a federal court sitting in diversity. Moreover,
perspicacious practitioners might well forum shop on that basis. On
the other hand, one can hardly characterize preclusion as rules that
"substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human con304. Because courts have exhibited confusion about this, I should emphasize that the Erie
question is whether to apply federal preclusion law or the state preclusion law of the state
where federal F1 sits. The question is not whether to apply the preclusion law of the state of
F2• Compare Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex FP Inc., 584 A.2d 1214 (Del. 1991) (addressing
the correct Erie question) with cases cited in Lilly, supra note 18, at 322 n.117 (incorrectly
using Erie to apply F2's state preclusion law). See supra text accompanying notes 269-73.
305. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
306.

See 380 U.S. at 471.

307. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). See Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988);
Burlington Northern R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1987); see also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 47174. Professor Burbank argues persuasively that under the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure cannot directly govern preclusive effect, but the rules can create a
context in which federal common law legitimately governs preclusive effect. See Burbank,
supra note 1, at 772-75.
308.

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
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duct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation."309
While preclusion rules affect behavior, their impact on behavior
outside of litigation is virtually nil. The impact of preclusion at F1 is
not on the primary conduct of citizens of the state in which F1 sits,
but rather on F1's policies as a litigation forum - that is, on the
federal court's power to control its own procedures.
It is analytically useful to separate the interests of the state in
which F1 sits from the interests of the law supplier. Very often, of
course, the federal diversity court applies the substantive law of the
state in which it sits. In those normal circumstances, the F1 state is
also the law supplier, and therefore may appear to have a substan
tive interest in the outcome of preclusion questions. But as ex
plained above, because the law supplier's interest in the outcome
generally has no connection to the law supplier's adoption of partic
ular preclusion rules, it should be discounted for purposes of choice
of preclusion law.310

Even if concerns of forum-shopping and vertical uniformity
might lead one to consider application of state law under Erie, that
does not end the analysis. If there is a countervailing federal inter
est, then courts must consider whether that federal interest over
rides application of the state rule.31 1 In the case of federal-state
preclusion, the countervailing federal interest includes all of the
federal forum's interests in controlling litigation behavior through
preclusion rules. Weighing this interest requires a consideration of
both the strategic incentives created by those aspects of preclusion
law that diverge and the value choices inherent in those litigation
incentives.312 The federal judicial system has a legitimate interest in
the litigation incentives created by federal preclusion law. By con
trast, the state in which the federal court sits has limited legitimate
interest in the litigation behavior of actors in federal court.313
309. 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 288-93.
311. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1958); see also
Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996) (balancing federal and

state interests but concluding that both sets of interests could be accommodated). If the
accommodationist aspect of Gasperini prevails, it might lend support to Professor Cooper's
"core preclusion" approach to interjurisdictional preclusion cases. See supra text accompa
nying notes 251-59 (discussing and criticizing the core preclusion argument). Professor
Cooper's approach seeks to accommodate the interests of both F1 and F2, but it could con
ceivably be adapted to the Erie context to require application of the state's "core" rules while
allowing application of federal preclusion rules outside the core.

312. See supra Part I.
313. One exception is the federal jury burden on a state's citizens.
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question is a close one. If we emphasize

the federal interest in federal court litigation procedures, as I sug
gest is appropriate given this article's demonstration of the signifi
cance of F1's interest, federal law prevails. If we emphasize forum
shopping concerns and vertical uniformity, state law prevails. Ulti
mately, the answer need not depend on Erie, because it is achieva
ble by legislation. If this article is correct that a clear rule for
interjurisdictional preclusion is essential and the better rule is that
F1's preclusion law governs,314 then to whatever extent Erie stands
in the way, the answer is to amend section

1738 to mandate applica

tion of F1's preclusion law in federal-state cases.31s
IV.

CHOICE OF PRECLUSION LAW: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In all the literature discussing how courts

ought

to handle in

terjurisdictional preclusion problems, there has not been any broad
examination of how courts in fact do handle interjurisdictional pre
clusion problems. I set about this task, focusing primarily on the
most interesting configuration - federal-state.316 The :findings in
the federal-state configuration can be summed up as follows:

(1) F2 usually applies its own preclusion law rather than federal pre
clusion law.

(2) F2 rarely pays

any attention to choice of preclusion law.

often does not matter whether F2 applies its own or federal
preclusion law, because the preclusion result would be the same.

(3) It
(4)

It sometimes does matter, however, whether F2 applies its own or
federal preclusion law, and even in those cases F2 often applies its
own law.

Of the

286

federal-state preclusion cases examined, the state

court relied solely on its own state preclusion law in

(59% ).
(22%).

169 cases
62 cases

The state court relied on federal preclusion law in
In an additional

(13%), the court appeared to rely
on both its own and federal preclusion law.317 In 16 cases (6%), the
36

cases

court cited neither state nor federal law in support of its preclusion
314.
315.

See infra text accompanying notes 340-50.
See infra text accompanying note 350 (proposing such

an amendment).

316. The research was conducted on Westlaw, searching all state court cases between
January 1, 1991, and August 5, 1996, for preclusion terms and for references to federal court.
The search produced 703 cases, of which 286 proved on examination to involve the preclusive
effect of a federal judgment in a subsequent state court proceeding. Those 286 cases were
examined to determine whose law the court used in addressing the preclusive effect of the
federal judgment
317. In some of these cases, courts cited both state and federal cases without any analysis
of whose law applied. In others, courts stated explicitly that the same result would follow
from either state or federal preclusion law.
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determination; presumably these judges relied on their own under
standing of preclusion law - presumably, their own state's preclu
sion law. Thus, in a substantial majority of federal-state preclusion
cases, state courts looked wholly or primarily to their own state law
of preclusion, rather than to the preclusion law of the jurisdiction
that rendered the judgment.
Certain state courts are more sensitive than others to interjuris
dictional responsibilities. The courts of Texas and Louisiana usually
apply federal preclusion law in the federal-state configuration,318
and the courts of California and Florida apply federal preclusion
law about half the time.319 If these four states are excluded from
the sample, the remaining states relied solely on their own state
preclusion law in seventy percent of the cases and relied on federal
law in only twelve percent.320
Few of the cases show any serious analysis of choice of preclu
sion law. In fact, not many show any analysis whatsoever of choice
of preclusion law. For the most part, the state courts appear to ap
ply their own preclusion law reflexively. They see a question of
claim preclusion or issue preclusion, and they address the question

just as they would if the original case had been in their own state
courts.321

Moreover, the courts fare no better in the sixteen federal-state
cases in which it appears likely that choice of preclusion law deter
mined the preclusion outcome. Of those cases, F2 applied its own
state preclusion law twelve times,322 applied federal preclusion law
318. See, e.g., Vergne v. Lamaze, 670 So. 2d 599 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Fernandez v. Memo
rial Healthcare Sys., 896 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App. 1995).
319. See, e.g., Abdallah v. United Sav. Bank, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286 (Ct. App. 1996) (apply
ing federal law); WIIllSatt v. Beverly Hills Weight Loss Clinics Intl., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612 (Ct.
App. 1995) (applying California law); Andujar v. National Prop. & Cas. Underwriters, 659
So. 2d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (applying federal law); West v. Kawasaki Motors Mfg.
Corp., 595 So. 2d 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (applying Florida law).
320. In the remaining 18% of cases, the court either cited no precedent to support its
preclusion decision, or cited both state and federal preclusion law.
321.

See, e.g.,

City of Rolling Meadows v. National Adver. Co., 593 N.E.2d 551, 556-57

(Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Trammell v. State, 622 So. 2d 1257 (Miss. 1993); American Home Assur
ance Co. v. International Ins. Co., 641 N.Y.S.2d 241 (App. Div. 1996), revd.
661 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. 1997).

on other grounds,

322. See Benetton S.p.A. v. Benedot, Inc., 642 So. 2d 394, 399-400 (Ala. 1994) (denying
claim preclusion under the Alabama "same-evidence" test, when on the facts of the case, the
federal transactional test may have resulted in claim preclusion); Wimsatt, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
614-17 (refusing to give preclusive effect to a California federal court's determination of the
enforceability of a Virginia forum selection clause, when under federal law of issue preclu
sion or direct estoppel, the determination probably would have been considered conclusive);
Gottlob v. Connecticut State Univ., No. CV 930521148S, 1996 WL 57087, at *4 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 19, 1996) (under Connecticut law, denying claim preclusion on the ground that fed
eral rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was not on the merits, when federal law would give dismissal
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three times,323 and once applied the preclusion law of the state in
which F1 sat.324 The cases in which choice of preclusion law mat
tered involved a wide variety of preclusion law divergences, includ
ing mutuality,325 same claim,326 entire controversy doctrine,327
claim-preclusive effect); Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., No. CV92 5175068, 1995 WL
216835, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1995) (same), affd., 687 A.2d 111 (Conn. 1996); Rolling
Meadows, 593 N.E.2d at 556-57 (denying claim preclusion primarily under the Illinois "same
evidence" test, when on the facts of the case, the federal "transactional" test may have re
sulted in claim preclusion); Jenkins v. State, 615 So. 2d 405, 406-07 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (rely
ing on the "exceptional circumstances" exception under the Louisiana res judicata statute,
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 13:4232(A)(l) (West 1983), to deny claim-preclusive effect to a federal
court dismissal for failure to prosecute, when under federal preclusion law, dismissal would
have been claim preclusive); Douglas v. Frrst Sec. Fed. Savings Banlc, 643 A.2d 920, 924-29
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (applying Maryland law of privity and nonparty preclusion to a
judgment of the Eastern District of Vrrginia and finding a nonparty bound based on the
nonparty's involvement in litigation, when under federal law, the involvement may not have
risen to level of control required for nonparty preclusion under Montana v. United States, 440
U.S. 147 (1979)); Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 536,
539-42 (NJ. 1995) (applying New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine to a prior proceeding
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and precluding claims against defendants not joined
in the federal action, when under federal law, claims against nonjoined defendants can be
pursued separately); Evans v. Cowan, 468 S.E.2d 575, 576-77 (N.C. Ct. App.) {denying claim
preclusion under the North Carolina "identity of causes of action" test, when the factual basis
for the suits was identical, so the federal transactional test would have deemed the state suit
to be the same claim as the federal suit, although preclusion may have been unwarranted
because the federal court remanded the state claims), affd., 477 S.E.2d 926 (N.C. 1996);
Lamontagne v. Board of Trustees, 583 N.Y.S.2d 838, 840-41 {App. Div. 1992) (applying New
York law to find state law claims not claim precluded by a federal court judgment on a
federal ERISA claim based on the same facts, on the theory that "implicit" state claims are
not precluded by federal dismissal of federal claims); Moldovan v. Lear Siegler, Inc., No.
C.A. 92CA005375, 1993 WL 46656, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1993) (denying claim
preclusion under Ohio precedent holding that an intentional tort claim is not the same claim
as a worker's compensation claim, because the tort claim raises "additional issues," when it
may have been considered the same claim under the federal transactional test); Dual &
Assocs. v. Wells, 403 S.E.2d 354, 356 (Va. 1991) (applying the Vrrginia mutuality requirement
to deny issue preclusion asserted defensively by a nonparty to a federal action, when under
federal law, defensive nonmutual issue preclusion would have been permitted, although issue
preclusion may have failed under the identical issue requirement).
323. See Hochstadt v. Orange Broad., 588 So. 2d 51, 52-53 & n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (applying federal law to allow defensive nonmutual issue preclusion, when under
Florida law mutuality probably would have been required, although the court suggests that
the result would be the same under Florida law); Reeder v. Succession of Palmer, 623 So. 2d
1268, 1271-75 (La. 1993) (applying federal claim preclusion law to preclude state law claims
based on the same Ponzi scheme as prior federal securities law claims, when under Louisiana
civilian res judicata, state claims would not have been precluded); Vergne, 670 So. 2d at 60003 (granting claim preclusion under federal law, when if filed before 1991, the claims would
not have been precluded under Louisiana civilian res judicata).
324. See Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex FP, Inc., 584 A.2d 1214, 1216-19 (Del. 1991) (ap
plying the Kansas mutuality requirement to deny issue preclusion based on the diversity
judgment of a Kansas federal court, when under either federal law or Delaware law, non
mutual issue preclusion would have been permitted).
325. See Columbia Cas., 584 A.2d at 1216-19; Dual & Assocs, 403 S.E.2d at 356.
326. See Benetton S.p.A., 642 So. 2d at 399-400; Rolling Meadows, 593 N.E.2d at 556-57;
Evans, 468 S.E.2d at 576-77; Moldovan, 1993 WL 46656, at *2-3.
327. See Mortgagelinq, 662 A.2d at 539-42.
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Louisiana's idiosyncracies,328 and treatment of Rule 12(b)(6) dis
missals as not on the merits.329
F2's propensity to apply its own preclusion law in the federal
state configuration is overwhelming. Could the explanation be that
F2 looks to its own state preclusion law because F1 was a federal
court sitting in diversity in that state? No. Many of the cases �
which F2 applied its own state preclusion law were federal question
cases at F1 •330 Moreover, in cases in which F1 was a federal court
sitting in diversity in a different state from F2, F2 generally applied
its own preclusion law rather than the law of the state in which F1
sat.331 The results thus do not turn on state courts' conducting si
lent, sophisticated Erie analyses to determine whose preclusion law
F1 would apply.
Although I have not undertaken a similarly thorough analysis of
state-state interjurisdictional preclusion cases, it is clear that state
courts sometimes apply their own preclusion law rather than the
328. See Reeder, 623 So. 2d at 1271-75 (under "civilian res judicata" prior to new statute);
Vergne, 670 So. 2d at 601-03 (same); Jenkins v. Louisiana, 615 So. 2d 405, 406-07 (La. Ct.
App. 1993) (under new statute).
329. See Gottlob v. Connecticut State Univ., No. CV 9305211485, 1996 WL 57087, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 1996); Gupta v. New Britain Gen. Hosp., No. CV92 517506S, 1995
WL 216835, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1995), affd., 687 A.2d 111 (Conn. 1996). Tue
Gupta court applied Connecticut preclusion law in deciding that the federal dismissal was not
on the merits and therefore was not entitled to claim-preclusive effect. See Gupta, 1995 WL
216835, at *4. Tue court, however, ought never to have reached that issue. Tue plaintiff
initially filed both state claims and a federal section 1983 claim in state court. Tue defendant
removed the case to federal court, where the section 1983 claim was dismissed for failure to
state a claim. Having dismissed the federal claim, the federal court declined to continue to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims and remanded those state claims to
sta!e court. See Gupta, 687 A.2d at 114 n.7. On remand, the state court was not hearing a
new action, but rather the original action that had been bounced into federal court and back.
Thus, claim preclusion should not have applied. In any event, claims are not precluded if the
initial court lacked or declined jurisdiction to hear those claims. See Keystone Builders, Inc.
v. Floor Fashions of Va., Inc., 829 F. Supp. 181, 185 (W.D. Va. 1993); First Interstate Bank of
Denver v. Central Bank & Trust Co. of Denver, 937 P.2d 855, 858-59 (Colo. App. 1996);
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. e (1982).
330. See, e.g., Gottlob, 1996 WL 57087 (First Amendment claim); Gupta, 1995 WL 216835
(Title VII, ERISA, and other federal statutory claims); Jenkins, 615 So. 2d 405 (section 1983
claim); Lamontagne v. Board of 'Ihlstees, 583 N.Y.S.2d 838 (App. Div. 1992) (ERISA and
Taft-Hartley Act claims).
331. See, e.g., Putnam Resources v. Frenkel & Co., No. CV 123838 S, 1995 WL 416194
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 1995) (applying Connecticut law to determine the issue-preclusive
effect of a District of Rhode Island diversity judgment); Douglas v. Frrst Sec. Fed. Sav. Bank,
643 A.2d 920 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (applying Maryland law to determine the claim
preclusive effect of an Eastern District of Vrrginia diversity judgment); Morgan Guar. Trust
Co. of New York v. Staats, 631 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (applying Pennsylvania law to
determine the claim-preclusive effect of a Southern District of New York diversity judg
ment). Tue sole exception is Columbia Casualty Co. v. Playtex FP Inc., 584 A.2d 1214 (Del.
1991), in which the Delaware court applied Kansas issue preclusion law to determine the
effect of a judgment from the District of Kansas.
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law of the rendering state.332 Other courts, however, have referred
to the full faith and credit statute and applied the preclusion law of
the rendering jurisdiction.333 Some courts, though applying their
own preclusion law rather than the rendering state's, nevertheless
demonstrate sensitivity to interjurisdictional concerns.334
Federal courts, on the whole, appear more attuned to interjuris
dictional concerns than state courts. In the state-federal configura
tion, federal courts regularly acknowledge that the full faith and
credit statute governs the effect they must give to state court judg
ments.335 When federal courts fail to apply F1's preclusion law, it is
not out of the reflexive application of their own law that is common
among the state courts in the federal-state configuration. Rather, it
is through misapplication of Erie analysis, through reliance on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine,336 or through use of federal standards
332. See, e.g., Ditta v. City of Clinton, 391 So. 2d 627, 629 (Miss. 1980) (relying on
Mississippi issue-preclusion law to determine the effect of a Louisiana judgment); Giudice v.
Drew Chem. Corp., 509 A.2d 200 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (applying New Jersey's entire
controversy doctrine to preclude a New Jersey action for failure to join claims in prior New
York action), cert. granted and summarily remanded on other grounds, 517 A.2d 448 (N.J.
1986); Middleborough Horizontal Prop. Regime Council v. Montedison S.p.A., 465 S.E.2d
765, 769 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (relying on South Carolina's adoption of offensive nonmutual
issue preclusion to determine the effect of a Minnesota judgment).
333. See, e.g., Speed v. Speed, 341 So. 2d 156, 159-60 {Ala. Civ. App. 1976); Miller v.
Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474-75 {Neb. 1975); see also Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 509 N.W.2d 829, 835-36 {Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (relying primarily on Michigan claim
preclusion law but declining to apply Michigan's claim preclusion waiver rule to a litigant's
failure to object to nonjoinder in a prior Kentucky proceeding).
334. For example, in Erenberg v. Cordero, 683 A.2d 567, 569 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996), the court looked to New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine to determine whether
product liability claims against General Motors were precluded by a prior wrongful death suit
in New York state court. The court allowed the claims by relaxing the entire controversy
doctrine based on "equitable considerations," including that the only basis for preclusion
would be New Jersey's idiosyncratic doctrine. The concurring judge, especially, was reluctant
to apply New Jersey's preclusion law based on proceedings in another state. See Erenberg,
683 A.2d at 573-74 {Stem, J., concurring).
335. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fullerton, 118 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1997) (care
fully examining Texas law to determine the issue-preclusive effect of a Texas guilty plea);
Warda v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 533, 537 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying Michigan law to deter
mine the claim-preclusive and issue-preclusive effect of a Michigan probate court decree);
Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d 1127, 1128-29 (Kan. 1981) (re
sponding to a certified question from a U.S. district court concerning the effect of a prior
Kansas state court judgment under the Kansas one-action rule). Recent Supreme Court
cases involving state-federal preclusion have emphasized that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires fed
eral courts to apply the preclusion law of the state that rendered the judgment. See Baker v.
General Motors Corp., 66 U.S.L.W. 4060, 4064-66 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1998) (noting that preclusive
effects "travel with the sister state judgment," but holding that a Missouri federal court need
not give full faith and credit to a Michigan state court injunction that exceeded the authority
of the Michigan court); Matsushita Blee. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873, 877 (1996);
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 {1985); Kremer v.
Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982).
336. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, named after District of Columbia Court ofAppeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 {1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 {1923), prevents
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while purporting to apply state preclusion law. First, instead of ap
plying F1's preclusion law, some federal courts in diversity cases
mistakenly apply the preclusion law of the state in which they sit.337
Second, at least one federal court has cited the federal Rooker

Feldman

doctrine to support dismissal of a claim that would not

have been precluded under state preclusion law.338 Third, some
federal courts, while purporting to apply state preclusion law, have
in fact applied something more closely resembling their own federal
preclusion law.339
Federal courts in general have treated interjurisdictional preclu
sion problems with greater sophistication than many state courts.
But in all three U.S. interjurisdictional configurations - federal
state, state-state, and state-federal - courts too often fail to give
prior judgments the respect that they deserve.
CONCLUSION:

A

CLEAR RULE

Excessive procedural debate only tends to make courts bur
dened, lawyers rich, and everybody else confused. Particularly in
areas in which predictability matters, such as when litigators must
make strategic decisions based on the anticipated effect of a judglower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. See 18 JAMES WM. MooRE
AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[3][a] (3d ed. 1997).

ET

337. See, e.g., Frrst Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 895 F.2d 254,
262 (6th Cir. 1990) (applying the Ohio mutuality requirement to determine the issue-preclu
sive effect of a New Jersey judgment in a subsequent Ohio federal court proceeding); Itzkoff
v. F&G Realty of NJ., 890 F. Supp. 351, 359 (D.N.J. 1995) (applying the New Jersey entire
controversy doctrine to determine the preclusive effect of a New York judgment in a subse
quent New Jersey federal court proceeding); see also supra text accompanying notes 269-73.
338. See Port Anth. Police Benevolent Assn. v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey
Police Dept, 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992).
339. In Frier v. City of Vandalia, 110 F.2d 699 (7th Cir. 1985), for example, the Seventh
Circuit held a section 1983 claim to be claim precluded based upon an Illinois state court
judgment denying replevin. Tue court cited the full faith and credit statute, recited the rule
that Illinois law governs the preclusive effect of the replevin judgment, and even cited Illinois
claim preclusion cases. See 770 F.2d at 701-02. Nevertheless, the court's ultimate decision
favoring claim preclusion made sense only under the broad federal definition of a claim and
not under the narrower Illinois test, as the concurring Seventh Circuit judge convincingly
demonstrated. See 770 F.2d at 703-06 (Swygert, J., concurring). Compare Salaymeh v. St.
Vincent Meml Hosp. Corp., 706 F. Supp. 643, 646-47 (C.D. Ill. 1989), in which the federal
court lamented that it was unable to dismiss on grounds of claim preclusion, because
although the claim arose out of the same transaction ·as an earlier Illinois lawsuit, it was not
the same cause of action under Illinois preclusion law.
In FDIC v. Continental Casualty Co., 796 F. Supp. 1344 (D. Or. 1991), a federal court,
addressing the effect of a WISconsin state court judgment, cited the full faith and credit stat
ute and looked to WISconsin case law on nonmutual issue preclusion. See 796 F. Supp at
1348. But on the critical question of whether alternative holdings warrant issue-preclusive
effect, the court relied solely on its own Ninth Circuit federal law and did not consider how
WISconsin courts would treat the issue. See 196 F. Supp. at 1348 (citing In re Westgate-Calif.
Corp., 642 F.2d 1174, 1176 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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ment, we should prefer a simple rule to a more intricate or indeter
minate one.
Moreover, we should aim for the possible. Given the finding
that courts rarely pause to analyze choice of preclusion law at all, it
would be futile to expect most courts to subscribe to a subtly
nuanced analysis of choice of preclusion law even if it were a good
idea. It may be possible, however, to establish this: courts should
not reflexively apply their own preclusion law to determine the
binding effect of another court's judgment, but they instead nearly
always should apply the preclusion law of the jurisdiction that ren
dered the judgment.
A decade ago, Professor Stephen Burbank demonstrated the
nuanced treatment that could be applied to interjurisdictional pre
clusion. In particular, he showed that an F1 referent need not re
quire application of F1 's preclusion law, because federal common
law, Erie analysis, and the Rules of Decision Act340 may point to
the preclusion law of the state in which federal F1 sits or to the
preclusion law of the jurisdiction that supplied the substantive law
at F1•341 Professor Burbank cautioned us not to ignore the inherent
complexity: "We need a law of interjurisdictional preclusion that is
sensitive to the complexity of our federal system . . . . "342 No court
has reliably adopted such a nuanced approach to choice of preclu
sion law, however, and there is no reasonable prospect that courts
will do so in the future. Making choice of preclusion law dependent
upon the source of the applicable substantive law leads to non
transsubstantive preclusion.343 If courts have been largely unwilling
tp apply another jurisdiction's preclusion law even on the simplest
analysis of looking to the jurisdiction that rendered the judgment,
then they are unlikely to apply various other jurisdictions' preclu
sion law depending upon the substantive interests at stake in each
case.344
340. 28 u.s.c. § 1652 (1994).
341. See Burbank, supra note 1.
342. Id. at 739; see also Burbank, supra note 302, at 641.
343. See supra note 292.
344. Professor Burbank's argument has the most bite in the state-federal configuration, in
cases implicating substantive federal rights. Because the federal courts generally have shown
greater sensitivity to interjurisdictional concerns in this area, see supra text accompanying
notes 335-39, the state-federal configuration raises less need for judges to have a clear, simple
rule. But litigants and practitioners need a predictable rule in every configuration. More
over, the litigation policies of F1 as embodied in F1's preclusion rules are equally at stake in
the state-federal configuration. The Supreme Court's repeal analysis, see supra text accom
panying notes 262-68, provides a suitably narrow safety valve for the protection of federal
substantive interests by federal courts at F2•
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Courts should adopt the following approach to interjurisdic
tional preclusion: F2 should nearly always apply F1 's preclusion law,
regardless of the configuration - state-state, state-federal, or
federal-state - and regardless of the source of the substantive law.
With the two very narrow exceptions of federal partial repeal of
section 1738345 and preclusion rules explicitly linked to particular
substantive rights of action,346 the effect of a judgment should be
governed by the preclusion law of the rendering jurisdiction. Pro
fessor Ronan Degnan proposed such a rule more than twenty years
ago:
A valid judgment rendered in any judicial system within the United
States must be recognized by all other judicial systems within the
United States, and the claims and issues precluded by that judgment,
and the parties bound thereby, are determined by the law of the sys
tem which rendered the judgment.347

The intervening years have seen Degnan's proposal dismembered
by commentators348 and ignored by too many courts. But it is as
sound now as it was in 1976 - sounder, in fact, and for reasons that
Professor Degnan only began to uncover.
The need for a clear, reliable rule of interjurisdictional preclu
sion has grown with the phenomenal growth of multiparty,
multiforum litigation. The unpredictability of choice of preclusion
law and the tendency of many courts unthinkingly to apply their
own preclusion law to other courts' judgments highlight the need
for a clear rule. At this point, the question should not be whether
to have a clear rule, but rather what that rule should be. The an
swer follows from an examination of the strategic implications of
preclusion law. Each jurisdiction possesses strong interests in litiga
tion behavior in its courts, and the manifold strategic implications
of preclusion law allow each jurisdiction to use preclusion rules to
guide litigation behavior in accordance with that jurisdiction's value
choices. This works reliably, however, only if practitioners facing
interjurisdictional litigation can count on the applicability of the
rendering court's preclusion law.
This article's analysis of interjurisdictional preclusion suggests
that any court deciding the preclusive effect of a judgment from
345. See supra text accompanying notes 262-68.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 291-93.
347. Degnan, supra note 1, at 773 (emphasis deleted).
348. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 104, § 4466, at 618; Burbank, supra note 1, at 736-39;
Shreve, supra note 235, at 1254 n.250. But see Lilly, supra note 18, at 328-29 {favoring appli
cation of the rendering jurisdiction's preclusion law).
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another U.S. jurisdiction349 ought to apply the preclusion law of the
rendering jurisdiction. This result need not await case-by-case ac
ceptance. Congress has the power to achieve this result by amend
ing the full faith and credit statute.350 That statute should be
amended in three ways. First, the statute should be changed to re
fer to "judicial proceedings of any court

of the United States or

of

any State, Territory or Possession of the United States," in order to
bring federal judgments within its ambit. Second, to remove any
doubts about the statute's authority as a federal choice of law rule
for interjurisdictional preclusion, the statute should require that
such judicial proceedings receive "the same full faith and credit -

including the identical claim preclusive and issue preclusive effect" as
they have in the jurisdiction from which they are taken. Third, the
statute should explicitly choose F1's preclusion law, rather than
merely an F1 referent, by stating that judicial proceedings receive
the identical claim preclusive and issue preclusive effect "as they
have

under the law of the jurisdiction

from which they are taken."

Choice of preclusion law matters because preclusion law varies,
sometimes dramatically.

The predominant interests at stake in

interjurisdictional preclusion are the litigation-related interests of
the forum that rendered the initial judgment. Those interests unlike the interests of the later forum that will decide whether to
preclude - are implicated whenever a litigator anticipates the pos

sibility

of future related litigation across jurisdictional lines. In

terjurisdictional differences in preclusion law matter to the initial
forum, because the details of preclusion law rationally affect litiga349. Many of the arguments advanced in this article apply with nearly equal force to the
problem of interjurisdictional preclusion in international litigation. Whether preclusion is
applied internationally, or interjurisdictionally within the United States, F1 has significant
interests at stake that point to application of F1's preclusion law, and the meaning of a judg
ment should be understood in light of the rendering jurisdiction's view of the judgment's
binding effect. Preclusion in the international context, however, raises issues beyond those
that arise domestically and is beyond the scope of this project. For an example of a court
treating international preclusion differently from domestic interjurisdictional preclusion, see
Alfadda v. Fenn, 966 F. Supp. 1317, 1329 {S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying U.S. law to determine the
issue-preclusive effect of a French judgment, noting that "[n]either the Full Faith and Credit
Act nor the principles of federalism apply to the recognition of foreign country judgments,"
and concluding that "[i]t is thus not clear that federal courts should defer to foreign coun
tries' issue-preclusion rules").
350. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 {1994). Congress's power to achieve this result flows from the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1 (authorizing Congress to prescribe the
interjurisdictional effect of state judicial proceedings); the judiciary article, U.S. CoNsT. art.
ill, §§ 1-2 (in conjunction with U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, authorizing Congress to establish
lower federal courts with judicial power over certain cases and controversies); the Interstate
Commerce Clause, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress to regulate commerce
among the states); and the Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (authorizing
Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for executing the various powers of the
United States).
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tion behavior in that forum. While reasonable arguments can be
advanced for applying a multilayered approach to choice of preclu
sion law, state courts not only never apply such nuanced analysis,
they rarely pay any attention to choice of preclusion law and in
stead apply their own preclusion law reflexively. This makes it im- possible for practitioners to predict, at the time of the initial
lawsuit, whose preclusion law will govern the judgment, and leaves
practitioners to make litigation decisions in the dark. For the sake
of predictability - and to give consistent effect to the value choices
implicit in each jurisdiction's preclusion law - interjurisdictional
preclusive effect should be governed by the preclusion law of the
jurisdiction that rendered the judgment. More intricate choice of
preclusion law analysis is unnecessary, unwise, and in any event,
unachievable.

